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We present a monetary model in the presence of segmented asset markets that implies a persistent
fall in interest rates after a once and for all increase in liquidity. The gradual propagation mechanism
produced by our model is novel in the literature. We provide an analytical characterization of this mechanism,
showing that the magnitude of the liquidity effect on impact, and its persistence, depend on the ratio
of two parameters: the long-run interest rate elasticity of money demand and the intertemporal substitution
elasticity. At the same time, the model has completely classical long-run predictions, featuring quantity
theoretic and Fisherian properties. The model simultaneously explains the short-run “instability” of
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flippi@uniss.it1 Summary and Introduction
This paper uniﬁes two main views, or theories, on money demand. One is the transactions-
based money demand that emerges in the models of e.g. Baumol-Tobin or Sidrausky. This
theory predicts a stable downward sloping relationship between real balances and interest
rates. This relationship is apparent in the low-frequency data, e.g. those describing decade
to decade movements. The second theory is the so called “liquidity eﬀect”, namely that a
central bank’s purchase of bonds, which increases the amount of money, creates a transitory
but persistent decrease in interest rates. These patterns are apparent in high-frequency data,
such as those used in the VAR literature for the identiﬁcation of monetary shocks. This
paper presents a simple segmented asset market model that uniﬁes both ideas, displaying
a stable long-run money demand, and explaining the short-term instability in terms of the
liquidity eﬀect.
We develop the model building on the ideas proposed by Rotemberg (1984), Lucas (1990),
Fuerst (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and others. To keep the analysis tractable
the previous literature ignored the lingering distributional eﬀects that follow an injection of
liquidity.1 Our model is simple enough to include these eﬀects and yet to allow us to com-
pletely characterize its solution, including a full analysis of the dynamic transmission of mon-
etary shocks, in terms of 3 primitive parameters: a measure of the segmentation of the bond
markets, and two parameters related to the households’ intertemporal and intra-temporal
elasticity of substitution between real balances and consumption. As long as only a fraction
of agents has access to open market operations, i.e. the bond market is segmented, the model
displays a persistent liquidity eﬀect after a once and for all increase in the money supply for
any value of the parameters. The basic mechanism for the persistent liquidity eﬀect is the
redistribution of wealth that is created by the operation. At the same time, and also novel
in the segmented market models applied to monetary shocks, we show that if the changes in
money growth are nearly permanent, the model delivers a standard money demand, with a
positive relationship between velocity and interest rates. These three parameters dictate the
long run elasticity of money demand, the strength and persistence of the liquidity eﬀect, and
the amplitude of the interest rates response to monetary shocks.
1See for instance Lucas (1990): “In [2] and [13], (referring to Grossman and Weiss, and Rotemberg) an
open market operation that induces a liquidity eﬀect will also alter the distribution of wealth, since agents
who participate in the trade will have diﬀerent post-trade portfolios than those who were absent. These
distributional eﬀects linger on indeﬁnitely (as they no doubt do in reality), a fact that vastly complicates the
analysis, eﬀectively limiting both papers to the study of a one-time, unanticipated bond issue in an otherwise
deterministic setting. This paper studies this same liquidity eﬀect using a simple device that abstracts
from these distributional eﬀects.” Fuerst (1992) uses the same assumption and comments about it: “This
methodology is not without cost. By entirely eliminating these wealth eﬀects, the model loses the persistent
and lingering eﬀects of a monetary injection captured, for example, in Grossman and Weiss (1983).”
1The model results are useful to interpret several empirical facts about money demand.
First, several authors have used high frequency data to document a persistent liquidity eﬀect
as well as a small interest elasticity after a monetary shock, see for example section 4.2.2 in
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) (see Appendix D.1 for a review of the empirical
literature). In Section 5 we use our model to reproduce these stylized facts.
Second, combining the results for the dynamics of monetary expansions, inﬂation and
interest rates provides a novel interpretation of the money demand data across low and
high frequencies. Assuming that the money growth rate is driven by both permanent and
transitory shocks our theory implies that the low-frequency changes in monetary growth
rates (e.g. decade to decade) will generate a time series revealing an interest-elastic money
demand such as the one estimated by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) (see Appendix D.1).
Instead the high-frequency changes of money growth will generate data-points that do not
lie on this money demand curve because of the liquidity eﬀect. This assumption allows us to
reconcile low-frequency US data on interest rate and velocity, displaying an interest-elastic
money demand, with the high-frequency data, featuring persistent deviations from it and
very small (even positive) interest elasticities. Indeed the reconciliation between the high
and low frequency ﬂuctuations of money demand is one of the challenges discussed by Lucas
(2000).2 In Section 6 we evaluate the predictions of the model quantitatively by simulating a
process for the growth rate of M1 compounding both a low and a high frequency component,
and comparing the model predictions with the US data over the period 1900-2006.
Third, the predictions concerning the eﬀects of transitory and persistent monetary shocks
are useful to interpret the evidence in Sargent and Surico (2011) and Cogley, Sargent, and
Surico (2011). They estimate that the correlation between interest rates and money growth is
smaller than the one between money growth and inﬂation, and also show that these correla-
tions vary from decade to decade.3 They also provide an interpretation of these facts in terms
of changes in the systematic response of monetary policy. Our model provides a complemen-
tary explanation of why, due the the liquidity eﬀect, the correlation between money growth
and interest rates is systematically smaller than the correlation between money growth and
inﬂation.
At a more abstract level the paper relates to the literature, both empirical and theoretical,
where shocks to diﬀerent “segments” of the asset market have mean reverting but persistent
2 Quoting from page 250: “The interest elasticity needed to ﬁt the long-term trends (and very sharply
estimated by these trends) is much too high to permit a good ﬁt on a year-to-year basis. Of course, it is
precisely this diﬃculty that has motivated much of the money demand research of the last 30 years, and
has led to distributed lag formulations of money demand that attempt to reconcile the evidence at diﬀerent
frequencies. In my opinion, this reconciliation has not yet been achieved [...]”.
3For the full sample averages see the ﬁrst row of Table 1 and the solid lines in Figure 5 in Sargent and
Surico (2011).
2eﬀects on relative prices because, due to frictions, capital moves slowly between them, e.g.
Duﬃe (2010), Duﬃe and Strulovici (2011), Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), Acharya,
Shin, and Yorulmazer (2009) or Edmond and Weill (2011). Our model describes an economy
with slow-moving capital and provides an analytical characterization of the link between the
long-run behavior and the speed of adjustment.
The setup and main results
Our model is a version of the segmented market model in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001)
where, instead of using a binding cash in advance constraint, we use a Sidrauski money
in the utility function set-up. Markets are segmented in the sense that only a fraction λ
of households (the “traders”) participates to the open market operations implemented by
the central bank to control the money supply. The household preferences are deﬁned over
a bundle h(c,m) made of consumption c and real money balances m. The intra-temporal
substitution elasticity between c and m is 1/(1+ρ), the intertemporal substitution elasticity
for h is 1/γ. We show analytically how the three parameters λ,ρ,γ determine the properties
of the model steady-state and the economy’s response, in terms of interest rates and inﬂation,
to money supply shocks.
We begin by showing that velocity is a function of an appropriately expected discounted
value of future monetary expansions, as occurs in the Sidrausky model as well as in related
monetary models (i.e. cash-credit, shopping time, etc). This implies that the price level (and
hence the inﬂation rate) are also functions of future expected path of money (and hence of
the growth of money). Surprisingly, the relationship between inﬂation and money is, up to
a ﬁrst order, exactly the same regardless of the degree of segmentation λ, and hence it is the
same as in an otherwise standard monetary model. The equilibrium nominal interest rate is
determined by the m/c ratio of traders, hence the interest elasticity of the money demand is
−1/(1 + ρ).
The economic eﬀects of monetary shocks depend on whether the shocks are temporary or
permanent. We illustrate this result considering two extreme cases. The ﬁrst is a permanent
increase in the growth rate of money supply. This immediately increases expected inﬂation
and produces a persistent increase in nominal interest rates and no liquidity eﬀect. The second
is a once-and-for-all increase of the money supply. In this case there is a jump on impact in the
price level, and no eﬀect on expected inﬂation. The model with segmented markets necessarily
produces a persistent decrease in nominal interest rates: since the shock temporarily increases
the m/c ratio of traders, they will only absorb the increase in money holdings at a lower
interest rate. The magnitude of this eﬀect at impact is inversely proportional to λ, the fraction
of agents participating in the open market operation. The persistence of the liquidity eﬀect
3is increasing in γ/(1 + ρ), the ratio of the interest-elasticity of the money demand relative
to the intertemporal substitution elasticity. This ratio governs how long it takes to the m/c
ratio of traders to return to its steady state value. Intuitively, the liquidity eﬀect is short
lived if the m/c ratio of traders is not responsive to monetary shocks: this happens when h
is very substitutable intertemporally (small γ) or m and c are poor substitutes (large ρ).
For temporary but persistent shocks to the growth rate of the money supply the impulse
responses of the nominal interest rate ranges between the two extreme cases described above,
depending on the assumed persistence of the growth rate of money . We show analytically
that impulse response of the nominal interest rate to a persistent shock is characterized by two
eigenvalues. One is inherited from the persistence of the shock process itself. This component
creates the classic “ﬁsherian” response of the interest rate to changes in money growth and
inﬂation. The other eigenvalue is related to the gradualism of the traders’ adjustment rule
for m/c, which was discussed above and is determined by γ/(1+ρ). This component creates
the “liquidity” eﬀect which can, at least temporarily, dominate the ﬁsherian eﬀect.
Our model displays a liquidity eﬀect for both unanticipated and anticipated monetary
shocks, although the eﬀect of anticipated monetary shocks may diﬀer from that of anticipated
shocks. In the model in Lucas (1990) and in versions of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)
and Fuerst (1992) only unanticipated shocks display liquidity eﬀects. On the other hand,
in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001), Occhino (2004), Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002),
there is no distinction between the eﬀect of expected and unexpected monetary shocks on
interest rates. The fact that both anticipated and unanticipated monetary shocks have an
eﬀect on interest rates, and that these eﬀects diﬀer, can be used in future applied work
to estimate the impulse responses of interest rates by applying the identiﬁcation strategy
proposed by Cochrane (1998).
Related literature on the liquidity eﬀect
The model in this paper is a descendent of the monetary models with segmented markets
of Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984). These models are motivated by the
hypothesis that, as described in Friedman’s presidential address, and in contrast with the
working of simpler neoclassical monetary models, an open market operation that increases
the quantity of money once-and-for-all produces a protracted decrease of the nominal interest
rate.4 In the models in these two papers agents are subject to a cash in advance constraint,
4For instance, pages 5-6 of Friedman’s 1968 presidential address: “Let the Fed set out to keep interest
rates down. How will it try to do so? By buying securities. This raises their prices and lowers their yields.
In the process, it also increases the quantity of reserves available to banks, hence the amount of bank credit,
and, ultimately the total quantity of money. That is why central bankers in particular, and the ﬁnancial
community more broadly, generally believe that an increase in the quantity of money tends to lower interest
4but access to asset markets where open market operation takes place is restricted to a fraction
of the agents. This fraction of agents, who holds only half of the money stock, have to absorb
the entire increase on the money supply associated with the open market operation, which
will be absorbed only with a lower real interest rate. Moreover, if this eﬀect is large enough,
the nominal interest rate decreases also. Mostly for tractability, these two papers assume
that agents have access to the asset markets every-other period. Not surprisingly, with this
pattern of visits to the asset market, the eﬀect of a once and for all increase in money supply
on interest rates are short lived: the largest eﬀect is in the ﬁrst two periods, after which there
are small lingering echo eﬀects.
Several monetary models of segmented asset markets have been written to analyze a
variety of related questions since the seminal work of Grossman and Weiss, and Rotemberg.
In all of them some carefully chosen assumptions are used to avoid keeping track of the
lingering eﬀects on the cross section distribution of asset holdings produced by an open
market operation. The simpliﬁcations have the advantage of allowing a sharper analytical
characterization of the equilibrium. Examples of these are Lucas (1990), Alvarez and Atkeson
(1997), Fuerst (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe
(2002), Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001) and Occhino (2004), which are discussed brieﬂy
in Appendix D.2. All these models have in common that an open market operation that
produces a once and for all increase in the money supply decreases interest rate on impact,
but then the interest rate returns immediately to its previous level. These models also have
in common that they produce a version of the quantity theory in which diﬀerent permanent
values of the growth rate of money supply are associated with diﬀerent inﬂation rates, and
hence -via a Fisher equation- diﬀerent nominal interest rates, but with the same level of
velocity. In this sense, these models have an interest rate inelastic long run money demand.
In this paper, we introduce a modiﬁcation of the set-up in which a once and for all increase in
the money supply produces a persistent liquidity eﬀect, due to the persistent redistribution
eﬀects of the open market operation, and additionally it implies a long-run interest-elastic
money demand.
There are a few models where a once and for all increase in the money supply produces a
transitory, but persistent, decline in interest rates. These models feature a diﬀerent mecha-
nism to generate persistence. An early example is the model in Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992). In their basic set up ﬁrms face a CIA constraint and, given the assumption on when
the household have to decide their cash holdings, asset markets are segmented. In this set-
rates. [...] The initial impact of increasing the quantity of money at a faster rate than it has been increasing
is to make interest rates lower for a time than they would otherwise have been. [...] after a somewhat longer
interval, say, a year or two, [they will tend] to return interest rates to the level they would otherwise have
had.”
5up, as well in the closely related set-up of Fuerst (1992), liquidity eﬀects are short lived.5
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) add to this basic-set up a convex adjustment cost ap-
plied to changes in the households’ cash holdings. The adjustment cost naturally retards the
adjustments, producing a persistent liquidity eﬀect. Another example is Williamson (2008),
who combines a segmented asset market model similar to Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001),
with persistent but mean reverting segmentation in the goods markets. In this set-up money
spent by those connected to asset market leaks slowly to the rest of the economy, spreading
the eﬀect of a once and for all increase in money. A diﬀerent mechanism proposed in the
literature for persistent liquidity eﬀects is sticky prices, a’ la Calvo. Several papers focus on
the conditions under which liquidity eﬀects emerge in simple versions of these models, such
as Gali (2002) and Andres, David Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2002). A shortcoming of these
models is that they are unable to generate a liquidity eﬀect and to be consistent with the
features of long run money demand such as a unit income elasticity and an interest elasticity
around −1/2 (see Appendix C for a more detailed discussion).
2 The Environment
Let U (c,m) be the period utility function, where ci is consumption mi are beginning-of-
period real balances. We assume that U is strictly increasing and concave. Let i = T,N be
the type of agents, trader, or which there are λ, and non-traders, of which there are (1 − λ) ,
respectively. While the focus of the paper is on the analysis of the behavior of interest rates
due to the unequal access to asset market at the time of open market operations, we ﬁrst
describe the equilibrium in a model without a bond market, and hence without open market
operations. We do so because it is easier, and it highlights the logic of the determination of
diﬀerent equilibrium variables.
Time is discrete and starts at t = 0. The timing within a period is as follows: agent
start with nominal beginning-of-period cash balances Mi
t, they receive nominal income Pt yi,
choose real consumption ci
t and end-of-period nominal balances Ni
t. Next period nominal cash
balances Mi
t+1 are given this period nominal balances plus Pt+1 τi
t+1 the nominal lump-sum
5Fuerst explains the lack of propagation in terms of his model very clearly: “As for the failures, the
most glaring is that the model is lacking a strong propagation mechanism. The real eﬀects of monetary
injections are a result of (serially uncorrelated) forecast errors. These eﬀects will therefore be strongest
during the initial period of the shock.” ...“This failure to achieve persistence is more a criticism of my
particular modeling strategy than of this class of models as a whole. If it takes more than one period for the
economy to re-balance its portfolio and ‘undo’ the monetary injection, then the eﬀects of monetary shocks
will of course persist. While this assumption may be the most natural, it is also somewhat intractable...”















Our choice of the timing convention for this problem is consistent with an interpretation of U
as a cash-credit good, as in Lucas and Stokey (1987). We use a Sidrauski money-in-the-utility
function speciﬁcation because, relative to a cash-in-advance model, it allows more ﬂexibility
to accommodate a stock m and a ﬂow c, albeit in a mechanical way. We will return to the
discussion of the speciﬁcation, and the relation between stocks and ﬂows, below.




















subject to (1) given M0. Notice that while we labeled the agents traders and non-traders,
the budget constraint in (1) indicates that neither type of agent is allowed to trade in bonds
or any other security. Their only intertemporal choice is the accumulation of cash balances.
Yet in Section 2.1 we show that the equilibrium of the model will be the same as one in which
traders and the government participate in a market for nominal bonds.
Market clearing of goods and money is given by
λc
T
t + (1 − λ)c
N
t = λy




t + (1 − λ)M
N
t = Mt
for all t ≥ 0. The government budget constraint is given by









for all t ≥ 1. Notice that the government budget constraint does not apply for t = 0, since
our timing convention is that we start the period with the cash after transfers. To simplify
the notation, in this section we assume that the government does not trade in bonds, an
assumption that we remove in Section 2.1. We note for future reference that the budget
constraint of the agents and market clearing imply that aggregate beginning-of period and
end-of-period money balances are the same:
Mt = Nt ≡ λN
T
t + (1 − λ)N
N
t
for all t ≥ 0. Notice that using the deﬁnition of Nt the budget constraint of the government
7follows from the budget constraint of the households:

















We deﬁne inﬂation πt, growth rate of money,  t, beginning-of-period real balances, mt,









































t + (1 − λ)m
N
t = mt, , λc
T
t + (1 − λ)c
N
t = λy
T + (1 − λ)y
N, t ≥ 0 (3)
the money-growth identity
πt =  t
mt−1
mt
, t ≥ 0 (4)






t + (1 − λ)τ
N
t , t ≥ 1. (5)
The exogenous random processes for this economy are given by st ≡ ( t,τT
t ,τN
t ). We
use st for the histories of such shocks, but we avoid this notation when it is clear from its
context. The f.o.c. for the agent problem w.r.t. ni
































for t ≥ 0, where the expectation is with respect to the realization of inﬂation and the lump
sum subsidy τi
t+1. We can now deﬁne an equilibrium:
Definition 1. Given initial conditions {Mi







t=0 an Equilibrium is an initial price level P0, inﬂation
rates {πt+1}
∞





t=0 for i = T,N such that: the budget
constraints (2), market clearing (3), identity (4), the government budget constraint (5), and
the Euler equations (6) hold.
8We conclude this section with two comments on the set-up. The ﬁrst is that our convention
for the timing of the model is one where the initial conditions Mi
0 contain the period zero
monetary injection, and thus τi
0 and  0 are not part of the set-up. For instance, our convention
entails that { 1,τi
1} are random variables, whose realization is not known as of time t = 0.
Second, in the monetary-ﬁscal policy described by (5), the resources obtained by monetary
expansions can be used for redistribution across agents, since the lump sum transfers τT
t and
τN
t are allowed to diﬀer across types.
2.1 Interest Rates in an Equilibrium with an Active Bond Market
In this section we introduce a bond market where traders participate and where the open
market operation takes place. We show an equivalence result for the equilibrium with and
without an active bond market, and analyze how the interest rate depends on the equilibrium
allocation.
We assume that traders at time t have access to a bond market and a set of Arrow
securities that pay contingent on the realization of st+1 which opens at the beginning of the
period, before consumption takes place, at the same time of the money transfer τT
t . Thus, if a
trader buys one nominal zero coupon bond in period t, he reduces his money holdings MT
t by
Qt dollars (the bond price), and increases next period holding of money in all states by one
dollar. Let Wt be the beginning-of-period money stock, after the current period lump-sum
transfer from the government but before participating in the bond market. Let BT
t be the
number of nominal bonds purchased, and At(st+1) the quantity of Arrow securities that pay
one dollar contingent on the realization of st+1. The price of each of these securities at the
beginning of period t is denoted by qt(st+1). In this case we can write the budget constraint
























t (st+1) + Pt+1(st+1) τ
T
t+1(st+1)
for t ≥ 0. The interpretation is that during the period the agent chooses bond holdings
BT
t and consumption cT
t , and given the budget constraint, this gives next period cash bal-
ances before transfers NT
t . The last line shows the beginning-of-next-period cash balances,
which include the cash from the bonds purchased this period and the cash transfer from the



























where wt = Wt/Pt, at = At/Pt, bt = Bt/Pt and t ≥ 0. The government budget constraint is:
 
st+1









for t ≥ 1 or in real terms:
 
st+1
at(st+1)qt(st+1) + Qtbt + mt =




t + (1 − λ)τ
N
t , (9)







(7), and given an initial condition w0.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the choice of nominal bond holdings BT


















































































where Pr(st+1|st) is the probability of state st+1 conditional on the history st. Combining















or, by letting rt be the nominal interest rate, 1 + rt ≡ Q
−1












Notice that, given the timing assumptions for the bond market, interest rates are functions
of the time t allocation, i.e. they do not involve any expected future values. For instance












which has a constant elasticity of substitution 1/(1 + ρ) between c and m, a constant in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity 1/γ between the consumption-money bundles, and A is a





















Finally, market clearing for Arrow securities and bonds, under the assumption that only
traders participate in these markets, is:
bt = λ b
T
t and at(st+1) = λ a
T
t (st+1) , ∀st+1 (14)
for all t ≥ 0. Next we give an equilibrium deﬁnition for the model with an active nominal
bond market:





and a monetary and ﬁscal policy de-
scribed by stochastic processes
 





, an Equilibrium with an active















the budget constraints for non-traders (2) and traders (7), identity (4), Euler equations for
end-of-period cash balances (6), the government budget constraint (9), the f.o.c. for bonds
and Arrow securities (10), and market clearing (3) and (14).
As in the equilibrium described in Deﬁnition 1, our convention for the initial conditions
W0,MN
0 include the time zero money injection, and so neither τi
0 nor  0 are part of the
deﬁnition. Instead BT
0 and MT
0 are choices for the traders, and hence bond prices Qt are
determined starting from period t = 0 on. The following proposition shows the sense in
which the equilibrium with and without an active bond market are equivalent.

















t=0 for i = T,N.
Then, for any stochastic process of transfers to traders, {˜ τT
t+1}∞
t=0, there is an equilibrium with

































11with bond and Arrow prices {Qt,qt}∞
t=0 given by equation (10) for all t ≥ 0, the ﬁscal and
monetary policy given by
 
˜ τN























, t ≥ 1.
with initial conditions ˜ MN
0 = MN
0 , W0 = MT
0 − Q0(a0 + b0)/λ, where a0 + b0 satisﬁes an
appropriately chosen present value.
The proposition shows that it is only the combination of monetary and ﬁscal policy that
matters. We use this proposition to analyze an equilibrium where all monetary injections
are carried out through open market operations. To see this, ﬁrst consider an equilibrium
without an active bond market and where τN
t = 0. In this case the budget constraint of the
government is:
Mt − Mt−1 = λPtτ
T
t .
Then, using the previous proposition, we can construct an equilibrium where ˜ τT
t = 0 for all
t ≥ 0. The government budget constraint is:
 
st+1
qt(st+1)At(st+1) + QtBt + Mt − Mt−1 = Bt−1 + At−1 ,
which in the case of a time varying but deterministic policy is:










In this equilibrium traders start with an initial value of government bonds that enables them
to buy the present value of the future seigniorage. The equivalence of real allocations, in
the equilibrium where transfers diﬀer across agents and in the one where money injections
are carried out through open market operations, illustrates the sense in which open market
operations with segmented asset markets have redistributive eﬀects.
In Section 5 we will consider a ﬁscal - monetary policy that is similar to the one described
above. We will assume τN
t = ˜ τN
t = ¯ τ and ˜ τT
t = 0. In this case non-traders receive a transfer
with constant real value ¯ τ and the government budget constraint is:
 
st+1
qt(st+1)At(st+1) + QtBt + Mt − Mt−1 = Bt−1 + At−1 + Pt (1 − λ) ¯ τ
We will choose the value of ¯ τ so that it coincides with the “average” seignorage in the
12economy, as described in Section 5. By doing so we make traders and non-traders completely
symmetric, at least in some average long-run sense.6
3 Approximate aggregation with Segmented Markets
This section studies the determination of inﬂation in the model with segmentation, i.e. when
λ ∈ (0,1). Given the equivalence established by Proposition 1, the argument is developed
using the simpler framework without an active bond market. In particular, we allow traders











We show that, somewhat surprisingly, up to a linear approximation the relation between
aggregate inverse velocity mt/y and money growth rates { t}∞
t=1 is independent of the fraction
of traders (λ), and hence that it is the same one obtained in a model with a representative
agent where λ = 1.
We assume that both types of agents have the same real income, so that yT = yN = y.
We deﬁne an approximate equilibrium by replacing the Euler Equations of each agent and
the budget constraints by linear approximations around the values that correspond to the
steady state of an aggregate model with ¯ mi = ¯ m, ¯ ci = ¯ c = y for i = T,N, and constant
money supply growth ¯   = ¯ π, satisfying
¯ τ = ¯ m(¯   − 1) , U1 (y, ¯ m) =
β
¯  
[U1 (y, ¯ m) + U2 (y, ¯ m)] . (15)
Let ˆ xt ≡ x − ¯ x denote the deviation of the variable x from its steady state value ¯ x. The
linearization of the Euler equation (6) gives:
¯ U11ˆ c
i




















 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
 
ˆ πt+1 . (16)
The linearization of the identity in (4), and the budget constraints in (2) and (5) gives:
ˆ πt = ˆ  t−
¯  
¯ m




















for i = N,T. We are now ready to deﬁne an approximate equilibrium.
Definition 3. Given initial conditions {Mi











t=0 for i = T,N,
6We can preserve the symmetry in other ways too. For instance, we can let non-traders have a higher




t=0 that satisfy: market clearing (3), the linearized Euler equation (16), and
the linearized constraints (17).
Using this deﬁnition we state our main result on aggregation:
Proposition 2. In an approximate equilibrium the processes for aggregate real balances
and inﬂation {mt,πt+1}
∞
t=0 and the initial price level P0 are the same for any λ ∈ [0,1].
The proof of this result is simple: in the equilibrium without active bond markets traders
and non-traders optimal decisions are characterized by the same Euler equation, evaluated
at diﬀerent shocks for {τi
t}, and the same inﬂation process. Linearizing these equations, and
using market clearing, one obtains the aggregation result. This result is important for two
reasons. First, substantively, it says that the relation between inﬂation and money growth,
to a ﬁrst order approximation, is independent of the fraction of traders λ. Second, it shows
that the equilibrium has a recursive nature. One can determine ﬁrst the path of aggregate
real balances obtaining the process for inﬂation, as we do in Section 4, and then solve for the
decision problem of the non-trader, obtaining the process for the non-trader consumption and
real balances. Using feasibility and the process for aggregate real balances, one can ﬁnally
solve for the traders’ real balances and consumption, which in turns gives us the interest
rate from equation (11). Since the problem of the non-trader is a key intermediate step to
determine the behavior of interest rates, Section 5 analyzes it in detail.
4 Velocity and Money Growth
In this section we consider a model with one type of agent, or λ = 1, to obtain a description
of inverse velocity and inﬂation as functions of future expected money growth rates, as in
the representative-agent model of Sidrauski, or in Cagan’s.7 Our interest in the setup with
λ = 1 comes from Proposition 2, which shows that the equilibrium path for aggregate inverse
velocity and inﬂation is the same irrespective of λ ∈ [0, 1].
Using market clearing (ct = y) into the f.o.c. for m, and the inﬂation identity πt+1 =
 t+1 mt/mt+1 we can write




[U1 (y,mt+1) + U2 (y,mt+1)]mt+1
 
. (18)
Our next task is to analyze the behavior of this system. We ﬁrst consider the steady
state, the case where money supply grows at a constant rate ¯   and ¯ r is the net interest rate
7Equivalently, we consider a set-up where traders and non-traders are identical, i.e. where yT = yN =
y, τN
t = τT
t for all t ≥ 0 with initial conditions MT
0 = MN
0 = M0 for any λ.
14that corresponds to a constant money growth rate and inﬂation ¯  :
U2 (y, ¯ m)
U1 (y, ¯ m)
= ¯ r =
¯  
β
− 1 . (19)
As in Lucas (2000) we interpret the function ¯ m of ¯ r = ¯  /β − 1, solving equation (19), as
the “long run” money demand. For the case where U is given by equation (12), this money
demand has a constant interest rate elasticity −1/(1 + ρ).
In what follows we analyze a linearized version of the diﬀerence equation (18), expanded
around a constant   = ¯   and m = ¯ m. We seek a solution for real balances as a function of
the future expected growth of the money supply.
Proposition 3. Let ˆ mt ≡ mt − ¯ m, ˆ  t ≡  t − ¯  . Linearizing (18) around (19) we have:











¯ U2 + ¯ m¯ U22
¯ U1 + ¯ m¯ U12
 
(21)
and where ¯ Ui, ¯ Uij are the derivatives of U ( ) evaluated at (y, ¯ m). With 0 < φ < 1 we can
express its unique bounded solution as




i−1Et [ˆ  t+i] t ≥ 0 . (22)
Thus, if 0 < φ < 1 and α < 0, future expected money growth reduces current real money
balances. We brieﬂy discuss suﬃcient conditions for this conﬁguration. Equation (21) shows
that the condition for α < 0 requires that U1+mU12 > 0, which is always the case if U12 > 0.
The assumption of U12 > 0 has the interpretation that the durable good is a complement to
the consumption of non-durables, and will be maintained for the rest of the paper. Notice
that −α(¯  /¯ m) is decreasing in U12 > 0, starting from a value of 1 at U12 = 0.
When U is given by equation (12) the requirements for φ can be written in terms of
conditions on: γ,ρ, ¯ r and ¯ m/y. Lemma 1 in Appendix A.4 shows that when ρ > −1, a
suﬃcient condition for φ < 1 and α < 0 is
γ < 2 + ρ +
y
¯ r   ¯ m
(23)
(otherwise if ρ = −1, then φ = 1). Notice that condition (23) holds for a wide range of
15parameters of interest.8 For instance, with an annual nominal interest rate of 4 percent,
annual money-income ratio of 1/4, and an elasticity of substitution between consumption
and real balances of 1/2, so that ¯ r = 0.04, ¯ m/y = 1/4 and ρ = 1, then γ has to be smaller
than 103, a condition that is easily satisﬁed by any reasonable estimate of the risk aversion
parameter γ.
Lemma 1 also shows that the condition 0 < φ, which ensures monotone dynamics, is:
γ <
1
1 + ¯ r
 
2 + ρ +
y
¯ r ¯ m





This inequality is implied by equation (23) as long as the length of a time period is suﬃciently
small.9
4.1 Linear State Space Representation for Velocity and Inﬂation
We specify a linear time series process for {ˆ  t} and rewrite the initial conditions exclusively
in terms of real variables. We start with a representation for inﬂation as a function of future
money growth rates and the initial aggregate money balances. Using (17) and (22) we obtain










i−1Et [ˆ  t+i] , t ≥ 0 . (24)
Notice that equation (17) is deﬁned for π0 ≡ P0/P−1 and  0. This representation avoids us
to carry a nominal level variable, such as M0, as the initial state. Instead, the initial state
is the real level of money balances, ˆ m−1. We assume that the detrended growth of money
supply ˆ  t is a linear function of an exogenous state zt :
ˆ  t+1 = ν zt+1 , zt+1 = Θzt + ǫt+1 (25)
for t ≥ 0, where z0 is given, ν is a k×1 vector, Θ is a k×k matrix with k stables eigenvalues,
and ǫt+1 is a k × 1 vector of innovations. In this case




i−1Et [ˆ  t+i] = α ν Θ[I − φΘ]
−1 zt , t ≥ 0 .
8Note that when U is given by (12) a suﬃcient condition for U12 > 0 is that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, 1/γ, is higher than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between c and m, given by
1/(1 + ρ).
9Note, by contrast, that inequality (23) is independent of the model’s time period since the term y/(¯ r ¯ m)
contains the ratio of two ﬂows (¯ r/y), and the rest of the terms are parameters independent of time. We
return to this issue in the discussion of Proposition 5.
16Replacing (25) into (24) we obtain:
ˆ πt = ν zt +
¯  
¯ m
ˆ mt−1 − α
¯  
¯ m
ν Θ[I − φΘ]
−1 zt , t ≥ 0 .
For example if zt follows the AR(1) process zt+1 = θzt + ǫt+1 and ν = 1, then k = 1, ˆ  t = zt,
and Θ = θ, so that for t ≥ 0:
ˆ mt = α
θ
1 − φθ











ˆ  t ,
given ˆ m−1. Recall that α < 0 if (23) holds, so that real balances are decreasing in ˆ  t and
hence inﬂation increases more than one for one with ˆ  t. This is a well known feature of the
standard variable-velocity model.
We summarize the linear equilibrium representation for the aggregate economy as a func-
tion of the innovations {ǫt}
∞
t=1, the parameters {¯  /¯ m, α, φ, ν, Θ}, and initial conditions z0
and ˆ m−1 as follows:
ˆ mt = κ zt , ˆ πt =
  ¯  
¯ m
 
ˆ mt−1 + ζ zt , zt+1 = Θ zt + ǫt+1 , (26)









, κ ≡ α ν Θ[I − φΘ]
−1 . (27)
For future reference we also produce a formula for expected inﬂation:
Et [ˆ πt+j] = ¯ Π Θ
j−1 zt, where ¯ Π ≡
¯  
¯ m
κ + ζΘ. (28)
As a special case notice that if ν = 1 and Θ = 0, so that ˆ  t is i.i.d., we have that real
money balances are constant (κ = 0), inﬂation is equal to money growth (ζ = 1), and hence
expected inﬂation is constant (¯ Π = 0), or:
κ = ¯ Π = 0, and ζ = 1 . (29)
Finally we examine the behavior of interest rates in the case of λ = 1 for the util-
ity function in (12). Denoting ˆ rt = rt − ¯ r and linearizing equation (13) we have: ˆ rt =
−(1 + ρ)(¯ r/¯ m) ˆ mt. Replacing ˆ mt by (26) we have:
ˆ rt = −(1 + ρ)
¯ r
¯ m
κ zt , t ≥ 0 . (30)
17For instance, in the case where zt+1 = θzt + ǫt+1 and ν = 1 we have







ˆ  t . (31)
Since α < 0 under our maintained assumptions, interest rates move in the same direction
than ˆ  t, and hence there is no liquidity eﬀect in the standard model. Additionally, nominal
interest rates inherit the persistence of ˆ  t: in the case where θ = 0, so that ˆ  t is i.i.d., then
the nominal interest rate is constant.
5 Interest Rates with Segmented Markets
This section analyzes interest rates for the following ﬁscal-monetary policy. We consider
a steady state, i.e a value of ¯ m for the aggregate balances that corresponds to a constant
money growth rate ¯   (the unconditional mean of the process for money growth). We set the
ﬁscal policy as follows: τN
t = ¯ τ, and τT
t = 0, and endow the traders with an initial bond
position that allows them to buy the seignorage not allocated to the non-traders, as outlined
in Section 2.1. In the absence of shocks −in a steady state− traders and non-traders are
symmetric. Yet when there are shocks, traders must absorb all innovations to the money
supply.
While our focus is on interest rates, for simplicity we analyze the equilibrium where there
is no active bond markets, which in Section 2.1 was shown to be equivalent to one where
all the money injections are carried out through open market operations. In particular, as
explained above, the nature of the equilibrium is recursive: we ﬁrst solve for the process for
inﬂation in the aggregate model, then we solve for the non-trader’s problem −which is done
in the next subsection− and ﬁnally, using the equivalence of the allocations with and without
an active bond market, we solve for interest rates.
We characterize analytically the response of interest rates to money growth shocks with
diﬀerent persistence. Equation (36) gives a closed form solution for the impulse response
of interest rates to a monetary shock, Proposition 8 expresses all its coeﬃcients in terms of
structural parameters for the case of a once an for all increase in money, and Section 5.2.2
analyzes the cases with persistent increases in money growth. These results allow us to discuss
the conditions under which interest rates responses are Fisherian, or display a liquidity eﬀect,
and if so how persistent. Furthermore, we show that in the presence of segmentation the
short run interest elasticity of the money demand is much smaller than the long run elasticity.
Section 5.2.3 deﬁnes the short and long term interest rate elasticity of money demand, which
is characterized in Section 5.2.3. Both the presence of a persistent liquidity eﬀect after a
18monetary shock, and the small interest elasticity of money demand over the short run, have
been documented by several authors, see for example section 4.2.2 in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999).
5.1 The Non-Trader problem
In this section we consider the problem of a non-trader choosing {nt}
∞
t=0, facing a constant
real lump sum transfer τN, a given process for inﬂation {πt+1}
∞
t=0 and given initial condition
m0 = n−1/π0 + τN. We simplify the notation in this section by dropping the superindex N
from n, c, and m, whenever it is clear from the context.
We start by studying the non-trader problem assuming inﬂation is constant at ¯ π ≥ 1. In
this case the state of the problem is given simply by nt−1. We solve for the optimal decision
rule g ( ), that gives nt = g (nt−1), and ﬁnd conditions under which it has a unique steady
state ¯ n = g (¯ n) that is globally stable. Furthermore we characterize the local dynamics of
this problem, i.e. the value of g′ (¯ n). In the second part of this section we use these results to
characterize the solution of the linearized Euler equation when inﬂation follows an arbitrary
process.
The next proposition uses the Bellman equation for the non-trader problem with ¯ π > 1:






N + n/¯ π − ˜ n, n/¯ π + τ
N 
+ βV (˜ n)
 
. (32)
to characterize the policy function ˜ n = g(n), and the uniqueness and stability of the steady
state. The proposition also characterizes the value of g′ (¯ n), which is important to determine
the speed of convergence to the steady state for the non-trader problem.
Proposition 4. Assume ¯ π > 1, τN > 0, that U is strictly concave and bounded above,
and 0 < U12 < −U11. Then the function g(n) is strictly increasing, it has a unique interior
steady state ¯ n = g(¯ n) that is globally stable, with 0 < g′(¯ n) < 1.
Using the decision rule g ( ) and the budget constraint, we can deﬁne the optimal con-
sumption rule. For future reference, it turns out to be more convenient to use m (real cash
balances after the transfer) as the state. The budget constraint of the agent is given by
m = n/π + τN and m + y = c + g (n). Thus c(m) ≡ m + y − g
  
m − τN 
π
 
and c′ (m) is














(1 − π g
′(n)) . (33)
We are interested in this elasticity because the interest rate response to money shocks depends
19on the changes of the m/c ratio. Equation (33) shows that the eigenvalue g′(¯ n), determining
the persistence of the response to monetary shocks, also determines the impact eﬀect of the
monetary shock χ. Since the nominal interest rate is proportional to the m/c ratio of traders,
see e.g. equation (13), a zero value of χ yields no liquidity eﬀect, positive values yields a
liquidity eﬀect.
In the next proposition we specialize the utility function to U CRRA and h CES, as
described in equation (12), and characterize the slope g′(¯ n) and the elasticity χ(¯ m).
Proposition 5. Assume U is given by equation (12), 0 < U12 < −U11 and ¯ π > 1. For any
values of the triplet ρ, r = ¯ π/β −1 and ¯ m/¯ c > 1, let A be such that r = U2/U1 evaluated at
¯ m/¯ c. Then g′(¯ n) and χ(¯ m) depend only on ¯ m/¯ c, γ/(1 + ρ) , ¯ π, β. Moreover:
0 < g
′(¯ n) < 1 , 0 ≤ χ(¯ m)
and g′(¯ n) and χ(¯ m) are increasing in the ratio γ/(1 + ρ).
Recall that 1/γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the bundle h, and that
1/(1 + ρ) is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between cash balances and consump-
tion. Proposition 5 shows that, somewhat surprisingly, the values of g′(¯ n) and χ(¯ m) depend
on the ratio between the elasticities, γ/(1 + ρ), as opposed to the values of γ and 1 + ρ
separately. The proposition establishes that χ, the elasticity of m/c, is increasing in the
ratio: γ/(1 + ρ). Intuitively, a smaller value of χ indicates that m/c is less responsive to
monetary shocks, and hence that the liquidity eﬀect is smaller. For instance, χ = 0 is zero
when γ = 0: in this case the ratio m/c remains constant, i.e. the adjustment occurs along
the inter-temporal margin, which has an inﬁnite substitution elasticity. Analogously χ = 0
when 1/(1 + ρ) = 0, since in this case the intra-temporal substitution elasticity between m
and c is nil, and no liquidity eﬀect arises.
This result can be understood by considering the behavior of an agent who starts with
cash balances below the steady state ¯ m. To reach the steady state the agent must reduce
consumption. If the reduction in consumption is large, then convergence to the steady state
is fast, and the liquidity eﬀect is short lived. To see why this decision depends on γ/(1+ ρ),
let us consider a case where the convergence to the steady state is fast, i.e. g′ ≈ 0. According
to Proposition 5 this can happen either because of a small γ or a high 1+ρ. Let us consider
each of these possibilities in turn.
Consider a case where γ > 0, but cash and consumption are poor substitutes, so that
1/(1 + ρ) ≈ 0 and γ/(1 + ρ) ≈ 0. In this case, the agent would like to keep m/c almost
constant, which implies that χ ∼ = 0, and since the initial decrease in consumption is large
then g′ must be small. Alternatively, a similar behavior is produced if the intertemporal
20substitution elasticity is high. Let 1/(1 + ρ) > 0 and assume that the bundles are very close
substitutes intertemporally, so that 1/γ ≈ ∞ and γ/(1 + ρ) ≈ 0. Since the agent substitutes
intertemporally very easily then the speed of convergence is high, or g′ is small, and thus it
must be that the initial drop in consumption is large, or χ ∼ = 0.
These examples illustrate why only the ratio matters. To see why g′ (hence χ) is increasing
in γ/(1 + ρ) consider now the case where γ is large, so the agent dislikes large variations in
the bundle h. In this case, the initial drop in m will be partly compensated by not decreasing
c too much, and hence χ > 0, and it can be close to one. This also implies that the adjustment
to steady state will take more time, or that g′ is high.
We conclude this part with two comments on the role of the steady state value of ¯ m/¯ c
in Proposition 5. First, as a technical comment notice that the condition that ¯ m/¯ c > 1 is
only suﬃcient, but not necessary, for 0 < g′(¯ n) < 1.10 Second, and more importantly, the
result on the dependence of the speed of convergence on the ratio m/c is less standard, but it
should be clear in this context. If the stock of money is very small relative to consumption,
the eﬀect of starting with a value of this stock below steady state can be quickly corrected:
if ¯ m/¯ c = 1 then g′(¯ n) = 0, so the steady state is attained immediately. In other words, if the
stock m is small relative to the ﬂow c, it must be that the length of the model period is so
big that it makes the analysis of convergence uninteresting. While this property was derived
for a money-in-the-utility function, we think that inventory theoretical models on the lines
of Baumol-Tobin, Miller and Orr, Alvarez and Lippi (2009), must display similar behavior.
Indeed, in Appendix E we analyze the continuous time version of the non-trader problem,
that deals more naturally with the stock/ﬂow distinction. In this case the corresponding
results of Proposition 5 holds for any value of ¯ m/¯ c.
So far we have analyzed the problem for a non-trader when inﬂation is constant. Now
we move to the problem of the non-trader facing the (linearized) equilibrium process for
inﬂation. We use the steady state ¯ n to deﬁne ˆ nt, the deviations of the end-of-period real cash
balances ˆ nt ≡ nt − ¯ n. Notice that a bounded process {nt}
∞
t=0 satisfying the Euler equation
(6) is a solution to the non-trader’s problem. Now we are ready to state a characterization of
the linearized solution to the non-traders’ Euler equation. Replacing the budget constraint
(2) into the Euler equation (6) for non-traders with constant lump sum transfers τN
t = τN,
and linearizing with respect to (c,m,π) around the values (¯ c, ¯ m, ¯ π) we obtain:
Et [ˆ nt+1] = ξ0ˆ nt −
1
β
ˆ nt−1 + ξ1ˆ πt + ξ2Et [ˆ πt+1]. (34)
10The following case obtains 0 < g′ (¯ n) < 1, without requiring ¯ m/¯ c > 1. Notice that Proposition 4 holds if
γ > 1, since in this case the utility is bounded above, and it only requires that in addition U11 + U12 < 0,
which is weaker than ¯ m/¯ c > 1.
21where the coeﬃcients ξi are functions of the second derivatives of U evaluated at the steady
state as well as β and ¯ π, given by equation (A-10) in Appendix A.7. The next proposition
assumes that inﬂation is governed by the linearized equilibrium described in Section 4:
Assumption 1. The deviation of inﬂation and real balances from their steady state value
{ˆ πt, ˆ mt}
∞
t=0 are given by the linear stochastic diﬀerence equation with exogenous driving
shocks {zt+1}
∞
t=0 described by the matrix and vectors {Θ,ζ,κ} as detailed in equation (26).
They imply that Et [ˆ πt+1] = ¯ Π zt as given in equation (28).
The state for the dynamic program of the non-trader problem is given by the last period
real balances ˆ nt−1, and the variables needed to forecast inﬂation, which given the linear
representation in Section 4, are (zt, ˆ mt−1). The next proposition characterizes the solution
ˆ nt = ˆ g (ˆ nt−1,zt, ˆ mt−1) for the linearized Euler equation.
Proposition 6. Assume that U is bounded from above, that 0 < U12 < −U11, and that
the deviation of inﬂation and real balances from their steady state value {ˆ πt, ˆ mt}
∞
t=0 are given
by Assumption 1. The unique bounded solution of the linearized Euler equation is given by:
ˆ nt = ˆ g(ˆ nt−1, zt, ˆ mt−1) = ϕ0 ˆ nt−1 + ϕ1 zt + ϕ2 ˆ mt−1 (35)
where the ϕ0 coeﬃcient satisﬁes: 0 < ϕ0 = g′(¯ n) < 1, and where ϕi are functions of the
coeﬃcients ξi of the linearization of the Euler equation, the parameters β, ¯ π, ¯ m, and the
coeﬃcients describing the (linearized) equilibrium law of motion κ, Θ, ζ and ¯ Π are given by
equation (A-10) in Appendix A.7.
The result that the slope of the linear optimal policy ˆ g ( ) that solves the linearized Euler
∂ˆ g/∂ˆ n ≡ ϕ0 is the same as the slope at the steady state of the optimal decision rule for the
non-linear problem g′(¯ n), is a standard one. As it is standard, ϕ0 is the (stable) solution of
a quadratic equation with coeﬃcients deﬁned by ξ0 and β. Recall that if the growth rate
of money ˆ  t is i.i.d. then real balances are constant (see equation (29)), inﬂation is i.i.d.,
and hence expected inﬂation is constant or: Θ = κ = ¯ Π = 0, ζ = 1. In this case, using
our notation for ˆ g( ) and the expressions (A-10) for the coeﬃcients ϕi in Appendix A.7 we
obtain that
ϕ1 = −βϕ0ξ1 = −ϕ0
¯ n
¯ π




¯ πˆ  t
 
+ ϕ2 ˆ mt−1. If the
economy starts with ˆ m−1 = 0 :
ˆ nt = g





22so ˆ nt follows an autoregressive process of order one, with parameter g′(¯ n), and innovations
that are proportional to inﬂation ˆ πt = ˆ  t with a (negative) coeﬃcient given by −g′ (¯ n) ¯ n/¯ π.
As a summary, we describe the evolution of the state of the economy and its dynamics in
the next proposition.
Proposition 7. The state of the (linearized) equilibrium for economy at time t can be
taken to be (ˆ nt−1, ˆ mt−1,zt). Their law of motion is given by equations (26) for (ˆ mt,zt) and
equation (35) for ˆ nt. The eigenvalues of the system are given by those on the exogenous state
zt, i.e. the eigenvalues of the matrix Θ, and by the pair (0,ϕ0).
The zero endogenous eigenvalue comes from the long run money demand, since we can
write ˆ mt = 0 ˆ mt−1 + κzt. The other endogenous stable eigenvalue ϕ0 = g′ comes from the
dynamics of the non-trader’s problem and depends only on the ratio of the elasticities. Thus
the dynamics of any equilibrium variable, including interest rates, depends only on these
eigenvalues.
5.2 Interest Rates in a Linearized Equilibrium
In this section we use the aggregation result of Section 3, the inﬂation dynamics of Section 4
and the characterization of the non-trader’s dynamic problem of Section 5.1 to solve for the
eﬀect of open market operations on interest rates.
We are interested in the following particular monetary-ﬁscal policy. Non-traders receive
a constant real transfer per period, equal to the steady state value of seigniorage. Traders
receive the remaining part of the seigniorage. The deviation from the steady state growth
of money supply evolves according to ˆ  t = ν zt, for an exogenous process zt as described in
(25). Equivalently, as shown in Section 2.1, we can regard this equilibrium as one in which
non-traders receive a constant real tax rebate τN
t and traders receive no lump sum rebate
but participate in open market operations. Returning to the equilibrium without an active
bond market, the values of τN
t and τT



















¯ m(¯   − 1)
¯  
.
where ¯ m solves
U2(y, ¯ m)
U1(y, ¯ m) = ¯ r ≡
¯ µ
β − 1. In steady state (i.e. when  t = ¯   all t), the value of
τT
t is also constant, and hence τN
t = τT
t = ¯ m(¯   − 1)/¯  . It is straightforward to verify that
these choices satisfy the government budget constraint (5). Also it is easy to verify that with
these choices for τN
t and τT
t if Mt grows at a constant rate ¯  , then traders and non-traders
will have the same consumption and money holdings, ¯ mT = ¯ mN = ¯ m and ¯ cT = ¯ cN = y.
23Now we turn to the determination of the path of interest rates. To do so, let’s use a ﬁrst
order approximation around  t = πt = ¯   and mt = mT
t = mN
t = ¯ m, cT
t = cN
t = y where
ˆ rt = rt − ¯ r. Linearizing the f.o.c. of the traders (11) with respect to cT and mT, replacing
ˆ cT
t , ˆ mT
t using market clearing for goods and money (3) to write the resulting expression in
terms of ˆ cN
t , ˆ mN
t , and using that the elasticity of substitution between m and c is given by
1/(1 + ρ), we obtain
ˆ rt
¯ r


























Finally we use this equation to solve for interest rates as follows. The term ˆ mt is determined
by the equilibrium in the aggregate economy, i.e. ˆ mt = κ zt. The terms ˆ mN
t , ˆ cN
t are
determined by the solution of the non-trader problem. Using the budget constraint of the
non-trader we have mN
t = nN
t−1/πt + τN and cN
t = y + nN
t−1/πt + τN − nN

































Using the decision rule of non-traders: ˆ nt = ϕ0 ˆ nt−1 + ϕ1 zt + ϕ2 ˆ mt−1, to replace ˆ nt, and
that inﬂation dynamics are given by ˆ πt =
  ¯ µ
¯ m
 
































































The interest rate is a function of (ˆ nt−1, zt, ˆ mt−1). The variables ˆ mt−1 and ˆ nt−1 encode the
distributional eﬀects between traders and non-traders. Indeed, as λ → 1, the expression for
the interest rate converges to equation (30) and, as already noticed, there is no liquidity
eﬀect.
5.2.1 Unexpected once-and-for-all increase in the money supply
This section studies the impulse-response of nominal interest rates when the growth rate of
money supply follows an iid process. Equivalently, we analyze the eﬀect of starting the system
at the steady state corresponding to ¯   and then shock it with an unexpected transitory one
time increase in the growth rate of the money supply at t, i.e.,  t > ¯   and  t+s = ¯   for all
24s ≥ 1, i.e. a once and for all permanent increase in the level of the money supply.
Let the initial conditions ˆ mt−1 = ˆ nN
t−1 = 0, if ˆ  t is iid we have that, as shown in
equation (29), κ = Θ = 0, ν = ζ = 1. This gives
ˆ πt = ˆ  t > 0, ˆ πt+s = ˆ  t+s = 0 all s ≥ 1, and ˆ mt+s = 0, s ≥ 0.
For the non-traders we have that for all s ≥ 0:
ˆ nt+s = ϕ0 ˆ nt+s−1 + ϕ1ˆ zt+s + ϕ2 ˆ mt+s−1 = ϕ0 ˆ nt+s−1 = [ϕ0]
s ˆ nt.
Using ¯ π = ¯   and that for iid shocks ϕ1 = −ϕ0
¯ n
¯ π we derive the following proposition, which
assumes that m/c > 1 (a condition related to the choice of time units discussed in the
comment to Proposition 5).
Proposition 8. The eﬀect of an unexpected once and for all increase in the money supply
at time t of size ( t − ¯  )/¯   is to decrease interest rates on impact, and gradually return to
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for all s = 0,1,2,..., where χ(¯ m) = 1 − ¯ m
y (1 − ¯ π ϕ0) .
Equation (37) shows that the sign and persistence of the liquidity eﬀect depend on the
magnitude of ϕ0. The impact eﬀect is negative, i.e. the nominal interest rate decreases when
money increases, if χ(¯ m) > 0 a condition established in Proposition 5.
To understand the mechanics of the liquidity eﬀect, note that the eﬀect of an iid shock to
money supply to the non-trader is to increase the price level, thus decreasing the post-transfer
real money balances m of the non-trader. If the consumption elasticity is smaller than one
then the ratio of money to consumption for the non-traders decreases, i.e. χ(¯ m) > 0. Since
with an iid shock aggregate real balances remain the same, this implies that the ratio of
money to consumption must increase for traders. In turn a higher m/c ratio for traders
implies, by equation (11), that the nominal interest rate must decrease.
The size of the impact decrease in interest rate after a once and for all increase in money
increases with χ(¯ m) > 0. Recall that Proposition 5 establishes that χ is an increasing
function of γ/(1 + ρ). The persistence of the liquidity eﬀect also depends on the magnitude
of ϕ0 = g′(¯ n), which is also increasing in γ/(1 + ρ). The closer the value of ϕ0 is to one,
the more persistent the liquidity eﬀect is. Finally, note that the more segmented markets are
(the smaller is λ), the larger the (absolute value of the) liquidity eﬀect at all horizons.
25To illustrate this proposition we compute the impulse response to a once and for all shock
to the money supply for diﬀerent parameter values. In all the impulse responses we use
annual inﬂation and real rate of 2 percent, U given by (12) and choose the value of the
parameter A to obtain a steady-state value of ¯ m/¯ c equal to 0.25 at annual frequency. We
let the model period to be a month. In Figure 1 we plot the impulse response for a once
and for all shock to the money supply which implies a 1 percent increase in the price level
on impact.11 In the ﬁgure we use λ = 0.25, γ = 4 and we vary the value of ρ. As it is clear
from Proposition 8, diﬀerent values of λ scale the distance to the steady state by the same
proportion at all horizons.
Figure 1: Response to a once-and-for-all money supply shock












































The shock is an unanticipated increase of money causing a 1% increase of the price level. The other
parameters are: γ = 4, λ = 0.25.
Figure 1 shows that for larger values of ρ, and hence lower elasticity of the long-run
money demand, there are larger liquidity eﬀects at impact, with shorter life-times. The
value of ρ has two opposite eﬀects on the impulse response of interest rates, as can be seen
from equation (37). The ﬁrst is a direct eﬀect of the preferences: a large value of 1 + ρ
11In the case considered in this section, where the money supply follows an iid process, this requires
shocking the money supply by the same amount, namely (µ0 − ¯ µ)/¯ µ = 0.01, see Section 4.1 for details.
26raises the sensitivity of the marginal rate of substitution of traders, increasing the eﬀect
of a given change in the money-consumption ratio m/c onto the interest rate. The second
eﬀect operates through the equilibrium determination of the elasticity χ, that was discussed
in Proposition 5. For a ﬁxed value of γ larger values of ρ decrease χ and hence imply
a smaller decrease at impact on the ratio m/c. The impulse responses in Figure 1 show
that the ﬁrst eﬀect almost completely dominates the second one, since the vertical distance
between the impulse responses at t = 0, is almost proportional to the change in the value of
1 + ρ. Additionally, diﬀerent values of ρ correspond to diﬀerent persistence of the liquidity
eﬀect, through changes in g′(¯ n). Higher values of ρ, as shown in Proposition 5, imply faster
convergence, as the ﬁgure shows.
Table 1 complements Figure 1 by computing two of the determinants of the impulses
response of interest rates after a once and for all change in the money supply for diﬀerent
combinations of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/γ, and intratemporal elasticity
of substitution 1/(1 + ρ). One of the determinants, the half-life of the shock, is a simple
transformation of ϕ0, and is given by τ ≡ [log(1/2)/log(ϕ0)], expressed in years. The other
determinant, denoted by χ, is the impact elasticity of m/c with respect to a change in m,
which is also a simple function of ϕ0.
Table 1: Once and for all shock to  : half-life (τ, in years), and elasticity of m/c (χ)























τ = log(1/2)/log(ϕ0) half-life of the interest shock , χ(¯ m) = 1 − ¯ m
¯ c
dc
dm elasticity of m
c w.r.t m on impact.
The values for ρ and γ for Table 1 are chosen so that the ratio γ/(1 + ρ) is constant on the
diagonal. The values of τ and χ across the diagonal of abreftab-iid-mu-shocks are the same,
which follows from Proposition 5, where it is shown that the decision rules c( ) and g ( ) are
functions of the ratio of the elasticities γ/(1 + ρ). The value of χ has the interpretation of
the elasticity of the ratio m/c with respect to an unanticipated once and for all shock to the
price level (hence to m). The values for this elasticity varies between 0.82 and 0.95 across
the values of γ/(1 + ρ) reported in the table. The range of half-lives across the values of
27γ/(1 + ρ) reported in Table 1 is between a bit less than a year, to more than 3 and a half
years.
5.2.2 Persistent increase in the growth rate of the money supply
This section analyzes the eﬀect of a persistent increase in the growth rate of the money
supply on interest rates. We use the general expression for rt in (36), the evolution of the
state mt given by (26), and the evolution of nt given by (35).
Figure 2: Response to a persistent money supply shock


































θ =0, 1/2 life (years)= 0
θ =0.5, 1/2 life (years)= 0.08
θ =0.8, 1/2 life (years)= 0.25
θ =0.99, 1/2 life (years)= 10
The shock is an unanticipated increase of money causing a 1% increase of the price level. The other
parameters are: γ = 4, λ = 0.25.
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses of interest rates to money shocks under the assump-
tion that the growth rate of the money supply is an AR(1) with autocorrelation θ, as opposed
to iid. Otherwise the parameters are the ones used in Figure 1 in the case where ρ = 1 (so
the long run elasticity of the money demand is 1/2). We plot the impulse response for four
values of θ, corresponding to a half life of zero months, one month, three months, and ten
years. The zero half life coincides with the iid case of Figure 1, and is included to help in the
comparisons. The size of the initial shock to money is chosen so that the eﬀect on the price
level on impact is an increase of 1 percent, as in the case of iid money growth.
28As can be seen from the impulse responses in Figure 2, the monetary shocks with a
shorter half-life produce a liquidity eﬀect. If the monetary shock is very persistent, instead,
the Fisherian aspects of the model take over, expected inﬂation rises considerably on impact,
and there is no liquidity eﬀect. Notice that for intermediate values of θ the impulse response
has an inverted hump shape, attaining the minimum some periods after the impact eﬀect.
The hump shape of the impulse response is due to the fact that the dynamic system has
two eigenvalues: θ, governing aggregate real balances and inﬂation, and ϕ0, governing the
non-traders adjustment of their real balances. Note that for the three smallest values of θ,
the impulse response converge to the same line, since the short run behavior is dominated
by θ and the long run by ϕ0. Instead, for the case where θ is much larger, the ﬁsherian eﬀect
dominates and the impulse response is almost identical to the one where markets are not
segmented.
To identify the eﬀect of segmented markets on interest rates, Figure 3 displays the impulse
response (to the same shocks) for the model with λ = 1, which has no liquidity eﬀects.12
When shocks are short lived, so that there are no movements in the expected growth rate of
money, interest rates remain almost constant at the steady state level. Comparing Figure 2
and 3 shows that when monetary shocks are very persistent the behavior of interest rates in
the model with segmented markets (λ = 0.25) is similar to the one in model with homogenous
agents (λ = 1).
5.2.3 Short vs Long Run Money Demand Elasticities and the Liquidity Eﬀect
We conclude the section with a comment on the relation between the liquidity eﬀect and the
interest elasticity of money demand. The thought experiment that reveals a liquidity eﬀect
on interest rate is an open market operation, i.e. an increase of the money supply. Instead,
the slope of the money demand is a relationship between real money balances −or velocity−
and interest rates. As explained, in this model the “long run” interest-elasticity of the money
demand is −1/(1 + ρ). The liquidity eﬀect of an increase in the (nominal) money supply,
too, depends on ρ, among other parameters.
As done in the literature −see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)−, we deﬁne
as the “short-run money demand elasticity” the ratio of the impact eﬀect on real balances
relative to the impact eﬀect on interest rates following a monetary shock. We argue that
there is no “constant” short-run elasticity of the money demand in the model. We emphasize
that this is consistent with the unstable estimates of the interest-elasticity of money demand
equations that are obtained using high-frequency data.
12As shown in Section 4, in the model with λ = 1 interest rates move in the same direction than expected
changes in money supply.
29Figure 3: Response with no segmentation (λ = 1)





































The shock is an unanticipated increase of money causing a 1% increase of the price level. The other
parameters are: γ = 4, λ = 1.0 (i.e. no segmentation).
To ﬁx ideas consider the case where the growth rate of the money supply follows an AR(1)
process with parameter θ. From our previous analysis we have that the decrease on impact






   
 










where α < 0 and 0 < φ < 1. Hence real balances decrease after a money growth shock, the
more so the more persistent is the shock. From our analysis of the impact on interest rates






   
 

























where ζ is given in (27) and the expression for ϕ1 is given in Appendix A.7 by (A-10). Thus




















m= ¯ m, ˆ µ=0, n=¯ n
.
To sign this expression notice that (1/m)(dm/d ) < 0, so the sign of the elasticity η depends
on whether there is a liquidity eﬀect or not. If there is a liquidity eﬀect then the elasticity is














if λ = 1,
In the case case of a once-and-for-all increase in the money supply (θ = 0) expected inﬂation
is constant and thus aggregate real balances remain constant (κ = 0, and ˆ mt = 0). Thus the
impulse response of a purely transitory shock on the growth rate of the money supply  t will
display a short-run interest elasticity of the money demand equal to zero. Instead, in the case
where λ = 1, i.e. when markets are not segmented, the short-run and long-run elasticities are
the same since the standard interest elastic money demand equation holds at all frequencies.
To illustrate the eﬀect of other parameters’ values on this elasticity, Table 2 reports the value
of η using three values of θ used in Figure 2, denoted by the corresponding half-life of the
shocks τ(θ), two values of ρ, determining the long-run elasticity −1/(1+ρ), and two values of
λ, determining the degree of market segmentation. The table shows that when the monetary
shock is persistent the short-run elasticity is closer to the long-run elasticity −1/(1 + ρ),
although the limit as θ → 1 depends on λ and does not converge exactly to −1/(1 + ρ).
Instead, when the monetary shock is short-lived, the liquidity eﬀect makes the sign of the
short-run elasticity the opposite of the one on the long-run elasticity.
Table 2: Interest elasticity of money demand at various horizons
shock half-life: τ (θ) ρ = 1 , λ = 0.2 ρ = 1 , λ = 0.1 ρ = 3 , λ = 0.1
1-month + 0.34 + 0.08 + 0.19
4-months + 0.93 + 1.25 − 0.40
10-years − 0.47 − 0.43 −0.23
The shock is an unanticipated increase of money causing a 1% increase of the price level. The other
parameters are: γ = 4.
316 A calibration of the model on the US data
In this section we present a calibration of the model on the US data. The objective is to
compare the model predictions with the historical evidence on money demand. In particular,
we estimate a stochastic process for the growth rate of M1 that is the sum of two independent
AR(1) processes, one with high-frequency (a half life of a few months) the other with low-
frequency (a half life of 10 years). We then feed this process to the linearized equilibrium
and compare the model predictions to the US data on velocity and interest rates in the 20-th
century at diﬀerent frequencies. Next we describe the data, the calibration of the model, and
compare the two.
Figure 4: US Money Demand 1900-2010

















Note: Annual data denoted by (blue) dots, the source is Ireland (2009), updated to 2010 data. The (red)
dashed line plots a log-log money demand with a 1/2 interest elasticity, which pass through the mean of
both variables.
The scatter plot in Figure 4 shows the annual US data (blue dots) on the money/income
ratio and the nominal interest rate over the period 1900-2006 discussed, among others, by
Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009). With these data in mind, we calibrate a monthly model
featuring a money to income ratio equal to 0.25 at annual frequencies, consistent with the
32data in the ﬁgure, this implies a value of A = 33.33 for the monthly model. We assume
U(c,m) is CRRA and h CES as in equation (12) and assume a long-run interest elasticities
of money equal to 1/2, which corresponds to a value of ρ = 1. This yields the long-run
money demand schedule in equation (13), i.e. the constant-elasticity dashed-line plotted in
the ﬁgure (in red). This interest elasticity is the one used by Lucas (2000) in his analysis of
the welfare cost of inﬂation and is consistent with the micro-evidence in Alvarez and Lippi
(2009). We set the intertemporal substitution elasticity equal to 1/4, or γ = 4, as is common
in the literature and within the range of estimates by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) and others.
The values of β and ¯   are chosen so that the (unconditional mean) annual real interest rates
and inﬂation rates are two percent (the values for our monthly model are β = 0.9983, and
¯   = 1.0017). We set the fraction of traders to λ = 0.5 (more on this parameter choice below).
What is left to be speciﬁed is a process for the (M1) money supply. Recall that a main
result from the theoretical analysis of Section 5.2 is that permanent shocks to the money
supply will generate data that trace a classic interest-elastic money demand. Hence, if shocks
are permanent (or, very long lasting) the model generated data will produce the dashed-line
that is depicted in the Figure 4. A regression on these data (in logs) will then uncover an
elasticity of -1/2. If, on the contrary, the money supply shocks are iid then the money/income
ratio does not respond to the shocks and, provided that ﬁnancial markets are segmented,
the liquidity shocks will produce data that display a zero elasticity between real balances
and the interest rate -whose variance will be increasing in the degree of segmentation. A
money supply process that combines independent temporary and permanent shocks will
then produce an estimated interest elasticity that is in between 0 and 1/2, depending on the
relative importance (variance) of the two shocks, as well as on the degree of segmentation.
We assume the stochastic process for M1 growth, ˆ  t/¯  , is the sum of two independent
AR(1) processes. The calibration below uses an estimate, discussed in Appendix B, where
one component is highly persistent, with a monthly autocorrelation equal to 0.995, which
corresponds to a half-life of about 12 years. The other component is less persistent, with
a monthly autocorrelation 0.5, i.e. a half-life of a month. The (annualized) unconditional
standard deviation of these processes is 0.006 and 0.065, respectively, which shows that the
largest part of the year to year variation in money growth is explained by the high-frequency
innovations.
To characterize the time-series behavior produced by the calibration we compute 500
simulations, each one 100-years long of our monthly model, on real balances m and the
nominal interest rate r and run the linear regression (on annual simulated data): log(mt) =
ˆ b0 + ˆ b1 log(rt) + ǫt. The objective is to compare these simulated data with the annual US
data on inverse velocity (M1/GDP) and the short term interest rate of Figure 4. The ﬁrst
33Table 3: Actual vs simulated money demand regressions
US Data Model
[1] Raw Data [2] HP ﬁltered [3] Raw Data [4] HP ﬁltered
ˆ b1 −0.31 −0.46 −0.25 −0.36
R2 0.45 0.49 0.47 0.69
DW 0.09 0.01 0.29 0.01
N.obs 107 107 107×500 107×500
Note: All regressions include a constant. The dependent variable is the inverse velocity: M1/GDP
in the data, m/c in the model. US annual data on M1 and the federal funds rate over 1900-2009.
The R2 is the squared errors of ﬁt statistic, DW is the Durbin-Watson test. The model statistic
are the mean value obtained from 500 simulations. The regressions in columns [2] and [4] use
HP ﬁltered data with parameter λHP = 104. The model is solved and simulated at monthly
frequency, and the data is annualized, i.e. we use non-overlapping averages during 12 months for
each variable.
column of Table 3 reports the results of a regression over the annual US data from the 20th
century. The estimated interest elasticity coeﬃcient of the money demand is −0.3.13 The
low value of the Durbin-Watson statistics points to a large positive autocorrelation of the
residuals. We report the Durbin-Watson statistics as a simple way to measure the persistence
of the deviations from ﬁtted money demand, which in our model will be related with the
persistence of the liquidity eﬀects. The third column of the table reproduces this regression
using the model-generated data. We run 500 simulations, each 100 year long, and report
in the table the mean value of the estimated regression coeﬃcient (the median values yield
similar results), R2 and Durbin-Watson statistics.
Recall that in the case of no segmentation, λ = 1, there is no liquidity eﬀect, so that
the model-generated data obey the “long run” money demand at each point in time and the
regression ﬁt is perfect (i.e. R2 = 1). The segmentation of λ = 0.5 was thus chosen to align
the magnitude of the regression R2 produced by the model to the one obtained from the data
(0.47 vs. 0.45, respectively). The table shows that the interest elasticity detected on the
model simulations is not very diﬀerent from the one that is obtained from the data: −0.25
vs −0.31, respectively. Moreover, the model data generating process gives rise to serially
correlated residuals which, as in the data, yields a very low Durbin-Watson statistics. Notice
that the positive serial correlation of shocks is the consequence, in the theoretical model, of
the gradual propagation of the liquidity eﬀect.
Another consequence of the liquidity eﬀect (i.e. of the high frequency shocks) is to
13 As discussed in Appendix D.1, the estimated interest elasticity ranges between 1/4 and 1/2 in the
literature.
34produce a downward bias in the estimated long-run interest elasticity. The regression on
the model data detect an elasticity of −0.25, instead of the “true” value of −0.5, i.e. the
value of the parameter 1/(1 + ρ). As mentioned above, this is due to the presence of the
liquidity shocks. The estimated regression coeﬃcient is a weighted average of the conditional
correlation (of size −0.5) produced by the nearly permanent shocks, and the (near-zero)
correlation produced by the transitory shocks. To capture the low frequency correlation
implicit in the data the regressions in columns [2] and [4] in Table 3 we use HP ﬁltered data
with a weight parameter of 10,000. The resulting trend series, for money and interest rates,
are then used in the regression. Consistently with the model predictions the interest elasticity
of the money demand becomes larger, both in the US data and in the model simulations.
In this section we characterized the patterns for velocity and interest rates that the model
produces by studying the implied correlations revealed by the coeﬃcient of a classic money
demand regression. Compared to the quantitative analysis in Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and
Lucas (1991), where the correlation between velocity and the nominal rate is essentially zero
because of an (almost) always binding cash-in-advance constraint, our model does generate
a positive covariance between velocity and interest rates, at least at low frequencies. As in
their model, however, the model produces too little variation for the absolute variance of
interest rates and velocity compared to the data. More shocks are needed, possibly to money
demand, to improve the model performance in this dimension.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper presented a theoretical mechanism that gives rise to a persistent liquidity eﬀect,
and characterized its relationship with a long-run interest-elastic money demand. One key
feature of our model is that the presence and the persistence of the liquidity eﬀect is de-
termined by a simple combination of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and of the
intra-temporal elasticity of substitution of cash vs consumption. It was shown that the log-
run (i.e. low frequency) properties of money demand determine strength and persistence of
the short run liquidity eﬀects. This provided a uniﬁed theory for the low and high frequency
movements of interest rates. The simplicity of the logic of the argument for the presence of
a liquidity eﬀect can be seen by noticing that a once and for all increase of money supply
must necessarily imply a liquidity eﬀect.
Our interest in monetary models that feature liquidity eﬀects based on segmented asset
markets is to provide a framework for studying policy questions on the eﬀects of monetary
shocks, such as those analyzed in e.g. Lahiri, Singh, and Vegh (2007), Nakajima (2006), Lama
and Medina (2007), Khan and Thomas (2007), King and Thomas (2008), Bilbiie (2008),
35Curdia and Woodford (2008), and Zervou (2008). Comparing with this literature, we have
deliberately kept the model as simple as possible. The simplicity allowed us to give a sharp
characterization of the theoretical results, such as the relationship between money and prices
in the presence of segmentation, and the impact eﬀect and persistence of the liquidity eﬀect as
a function of simple elasticities. The disadvantage of this simplicity is that this version of the
model lacks some features that may be interesting for some policy questions. For instance,
the model has exogenous endowment, ﬂexible prices, and constant exogenous participation
rates in the bond markets. In this regard we view the result of the model as applying to the
aggregate nominal demand. We think that it is feasible and interesting to extend the model
in several dimensions: to have variable inputs, so that the model can be used to study the
“real” eﬀects of monetary shocks, and/or to introduce nominal rigidities, so that we can use
it to study whether liquidity eﬀects are substitutes or complements of them, or to introduce
diﬀerential shocks to participants and non-participants in bond markets, to study the welfare
eﬀect of interest rate smoothing.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
The tilde allocation satisﬁes market clearing for cash balances and consumption, since they
are satisﬁed in the original equilibrium. Market clearing of bonds is satisﬁed trivially by
construction. The budget constraint of the government is satisﬁed by construction too, given
that the budget constraint for the original equilibrium is satisﬁed. The tilde allocation solve
the problem of the non-traders since their budget constraint is identical. Finally, for traders,










t=0 solve the trader’s problem. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
By adding the Euler equation of the traders times λ to the Euler equation of the non-traders
times (1 − λ) we obtain the following Euler equation for the aggregate real balances:
¯ U11ˆ ct + ¯ U12 ˆ mt = Et
β
¯ π
  ¯ U11 + ¯ U21
 
ˆ ct+1 +







 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
 
ˆ πt+1.
Feasibility implies that ˆ ct = 0, hence the Euler equation becomes
¯ U12 ˆ mt = Et
β
¯ π







 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
 
ˆ πt+1
Using the linearized money growth identity in equation (17) to replace ˆ πt+1 into the Euler
equation we get
¯ U12 ˆ mt = Et
β
¯ π







 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
  









¯ U12 ˆ mt +
β
¯ π2
 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
  ¯  
¯ m
ˆ mt = Et
β
¯ π







 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
  





multiplying by ¯ m and using that in the steady state ¯ π = ¯   and ¯ U1 = β/¯  
 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
 
:
 ¯ U12 ¯ m + ¯ U1
 
ˆ mt = −Et
β
¯  2
 ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
 





 ¯ U12 + ¯ U22
 
+ ¯ U1 + ¯ U2
 
ˆ mt+1 (A-1)
which is identical to the Euler Equation for the aggregate model that is obtained by linearizing
(18) around the steady state. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Linearizing (18) around the steady state gives equation (A-1). Using the deﬁnitions for α
and φ in equation (21) gives (20). Q.E.D.
1A.4 Suﬃcient conditions for 0 < φ < 1 and α < 0
Lemma 1. Let the utility be given by equation (12). Then φ < 1 and α < 0 if
γ < 2 + ρ +
1
r(m/c)
and ρ > −1






























































































φ ≡ (β/¯  )
 
1 +
¯ U2 + ¯ m¯ U22







(1 − γ) r(m/c) − ρ
(2 − γ + ρ)r (m/c) + 1
 
.
Suﬃcient conditions for 0 < φ < 1 are the following. The condition for φ < 1 requires:
(1 − γ) r(m/c) − ρ
(2 − γ + ρ)r(m/c) + 1
< 1
If (2 − γ + ρ)r(m/c) + 1 > 0, this inequality is:
0 < (1 + ρ)(1 + rm/c)
2which holds if ρ > −1. If ρ = −1, then φ = 1. This establishes the condition for φ < 1:
γ < 2 + ρ +
1
r(m/c)
and ρ > −1 .
The condition for φ > 0 requires
−1 < r
(1 − γ) r(m/c) − ρ
(2 − γ + ρ)r(m/c) + 1
Since the denominator is positive (whenever φ < 1), this inequality implies
−(2 − γ + ρ)r(m/c) − 1 < r[(1 − γ) r(m/c) − ρ]
which, after rearranging terms, gives the second inequality in Lemma 1 .
Finally the condition for α < 0 if and only if ¯ U1 + ¯ m¯ U12 > 0. Using equation (13) and








(2 − γ + ρ)r (m/c) + 1
1 + r(m/c)
so U1 + mU12 > 0 holds if (2 − γ + ρ)r(m/c) + 1 > 0 or, as is immediate to verify, the
condition for φ < 1 holds.
Using the steady state equilibrium condition in equation (13) and the deﬁnition for the
nominal interest rate in equation (19) we can rewrite the condition for α < 0 and φ < 1 in
terms of exogenous parameters as










and ρ > −1 .
Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.
Under the stated conditions the value function V is strictly concave and diﬀerentiable. The














′ (g (n)) (A-2)
for all n ≥ 0. Since V is concave, V ′ is decreasing and since U11 + U12 < 0 the LHS of the








































































Under the assumption that U12 ≥ 0 and ¯ π > 1 it is easy to see that there is a unique steady
state ¯ n satisfying this equation.
We now show that this steady state is globally stable. Suppose not, i.e. that g′(n) > 1,
and assume that n0 > ¯ n, then limnt = ∞. But notice that V is bounded below, since
V (n) ≥ V (0) ≥ U
 
y + τN,τN 
/(1 − β). Additionally we assume that U is bounded above.
In this case, since V is concave,
V (nt) ≥ V (0) + V
′ (nt)nt
and hence as nt → ∞ it must be that
V
′ (nt) = U1
 
nt/¯ π + y + τ




nt/¯ π + y + τ
N − nt+1,nt/¯ π + τ
N 
→ 0.





nt/¯ π + y + τ
N − nt+1,nt/¯ π + τ
N 
= 0
Since U12 ≥ 0 then
U1
 
nt/¯ π + y + τ




nt/¯ π + y + τ
N − nt+1,τ
N 
but if nt+1 > nt, for ¯ π > 1
U1
 









a contradiction. Hence limt nt must be bounded, and thus g′ (¯ n) < 1. Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5.
-Part I. Using ˆ nt = g′   ˆ nt−1 for the policy rule gives ˆ mt = ˆ nt−1/¯ π, ˆ ct = (1/¯ π − g′) ˆ nt−1 and
ˆ mt+1 = g′ˆ nt−1/¯ π, ˆ ct+1 = (1/¯ π− g′) g′ˆ nt−1. Totally diﬀerentiating the Euler equation (6) and
using the above policy functions gives a second order ODE with characteristic equation
0 = β (ϕ0)
2 + bϕ0 + 1,
















Note that −b > 0 under the assumption U11 + U12 < 0 and π > 1. As an intermediate step
for the proof, the next lemma gives the properties of ϕ0 as a function of −b.







with 0 < ϕ0 ≤ 1, provided that −b ≥ 1 + β. Moreover, ϕ0 is decreasing in −b.
Proof of Lemma 2. A real solution requires b2 − 4β ≥ 0. If −b ≥ 1 + β, then
b2 ≥ (1 + β)
2 = 1 + β2 + 2β, and b2 − 4β ≥ (1 − β)
2 > 0. If −b = 1 + β then ϕ0 = 1. To see

































- Part II. We show that the coeﬃcients of the equation that deﬁnes ϕ0 ≡ g′(¯ n) are a
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Using that h is CES we have
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5which are functions of the ratio γ/(1 + ρ), the number r, and the ratio m/c.








¯ π(1 + r)2)




where x ≡ c/m ∈ (0,1) and ˜ γ ≡ γ/(1 + ρ).













(1 + r)(1 − x)
 
(A-7)
Noting that at the steady state
β
¯ π(1 + r) = 1 (by equation (13)) establishes that −b is
decreasing in γ/(1+ρ). This, by Lemma 2, implies that the root ϕ0 is increasing in γ/(1+ρ).
-Part III. We conclude the proof by showing that 0 < χ(¯ m) for ¯ π > 1 and m/c > 1. The
proof is in two parts. We ﬁrst analyze the case of γ = 0. Then we extend the results for the
case of γ > 0.
Assume γ = 0. We show that the elasticity of c(m) with respect to m, evaluated at










π ≤ ϕ0. Using equation (A-4) this inequality becomes









b2 − 4β ≥ 0 (A-8)







(1 − x) (A-9)
where x ≡ c/m. We want to show that inequality (A-8) holds for x ∈ (0,1), i.e. that






2 − 4β > 0 .
This follows because: a(0) > 0 and a′ (x) > 0 for x ∈ (0,1). These two inequalities follow
from:














Using that π > 1, we have
























































We conclude the proof for the γ = 0 case by showing that −b > 1 + β (an assumption
in Lemma 2). From equation (A-6) with ˜ γ = 0, simple algebra shows that the inequality
−b > 1 + β holds if π > 1 and m/c > 1.





π ≤ ϕ0 . This inequality was shown to hold for γ = 0. Since ϕ0 is increasing in ˜ γ,
then it holds a fortiori for γ > 0. The inequality −b ≥ 1+β holds, since −b is decreasing in
˜ γ and lim˜ γ→∞(−b) = 1 + β.
A.7 Expressions for the linearized Non-Trader problem
Coeﬃcients for the linearization of the Euler equation of the Non-Trader’s problem.
ξ0 =
 
¯ π¯ U11 +
β
¯ π
 ¯ U11 + ¯ U12 + ¯ U21 + ¯ U22
  
β
 ¯ U11 + ¯ U21













 ¯ U11 + ¯ U12 + ¯ U21 + ¯ U22
 






Coeﬃcients for the equilibrium solution of the Non-Trader’s problem:
(ϕ0 − ξ0)ϕ0 +
1
β
= 0, , (ϕ0 − ξ0)ϕ2 = ξ1




(ϕ0 − ξ0)ϕ1 + ϕ1Θ + ϕ2κ = ξ1ζ + ξ2¯ Π
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6.
We try a solution of the form
nt = ϕ0 ˆ nt−1 + ϕ1 zt + ϕ2 ˆ mt−1
with coeﬃcients ϕ0, ϕ2 and ϕ2 to be determined. Replacing the hypothesis for inﬂation and
expected inﬂation the Euler equation:
Et [ˆ nt+1] = ξ0ˆ nt −
1
β
ˆ nt−1 + ξ1
   ¯  
¯ m
 
ˆ mt−1 + ζ zt
 
+ ξ2¯ Π zt .
Taking expected values on the guess for the solution of the policy:
Et [ˆ nt+1] = ϕ0 ˆ nt + ϕ1 Et [zt+1] + ϕ2 ˆ mt = ϕ0 ˆ nt + ϕ1Θ zt + ϕ2κ zt
7Equating the two terms:
ϕ0 ˆ nt + ϕ1Θ zt + ϕ2κ zt = ξ0ˆ nt −
1
β
ˆ nt−1 + ξ1
   ¯  
¯ m
 
ˆ mt−1 + ζ zt
 
+ ξ2¯ Π zt
rearranging
(ϕ0 − ξ0) ˆ nt + ϕ1Θ zt + ϕ2κ zt = −
1
β
ˆ nt−1 + ξ1
   ¯  
¯ m
 
ˆ mt−1 + ζ zt
 
+ ξ2¯ Π zt
Replacing again the guess for the optimal policy in ˆ nt :
(ϕ0 − ξ0)[ϕ0ˆ nt−1 + ϕ1zt + ϕ2 ˆ mt−1] + ϕ1Θzt + ϕ2κzt = −
1
β
ˆ nt−1 + ξ1
   ¯  
¯ m
 










ξ1ζ + ξ2¯ Π
 
zt + ξ1





(ϕ0 − ξ0)ϕ0 = −
1
β
, (ϕ0 − ξ0)ϕ2 = ξ1
  ¯  
¯ m
 
, (ϕ0 − ξ0)ϕ1 + ϕ1Θ + ϕ2κ = ξ1ζ + ξ2¯ Π
That ϕ0 = g′ (¯ n) can be veriﬁed immediately by linearizing the f.o.c. of the problem for the
non-trader with constant inﬂation ¯ π. Then, using Proposition 4, we then have 0 < ϕ0 =
g′(¯ n) < 1.Q.E.D.
B Estimating a two-component process for  t
In this appendix we setup and estimate a two-component process for money growth using
monthly US data on M1 for the period 1959.1-2009.9. Let { t}t=1,...,T be the sample of
observed money growth rates, i.e. the log change in the levels of the nominal money stock.
We assume that it is the sum of two unobserved, independent processes, each of them of the
form:
 i,t+1 − ¯   = θi ( i,t − ¯  ) + ǫi,t+1
where i = 1,2, the innovations {ǫi,t} are i.i.d., through time and independent of each other,
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σi
2. We have then  t =  1,t +  2,t for
t = 1,...,T. Assuming the process was in place for a long time before the beginning of the
sample implies that the initial observation is drawn from the invariant distribution, which is





The theoretical autocovariance function for   is given by:














8for k = 0,1,2,3,....
To estimate the 4 parameters (θ1,θ2,σ1,σ2), we use a GMM algorithm that minimizes
the distance between J selected elements from the ACF function of M1 and this theoretical
counterpart, where identiﬁcation obviously requires that J ≥ 4, giving an equal weight to














Ω(j − 1) − ˆ Ω(j − 1)
 2
The table below reports one set of estimates based on monthly data, for a choice of J that
matches very high frequencies (1-three months) (J = 1 − 3), business cycle (J = 57 − 60),
and 10 year frequencies (J = 117 − 120)






J = [1 : 3],[57 : 60],[117 : 120] 0.995 0.00005 154 0.466 0.0048 0.9
Note: Based on M1 monthly data (not seasonally adjusted) over the sample period 1959:1-2009:9. Data
source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The half life is τi = log(1/2)/log(θi)
C Relation to sticky-price models (with no capital)
There are two properties of agents’ preferences that are required to make the model consistent
with both low and high frequency data: (1) a unitary income elasticity of money demand
and (2) the stylized facts along a BGP. The latter means that the model must be consistent
with a BGP with constant real interest rates, constant leisure, and the following growing at
the same rate: real wages, real balances and consumption, and this must be so for arbitrary
nominal wages and initial real wages. These points are important for us because we want to
connect the low-frequency and high-frequency features of the data within the same model.





1−γ   v(l)
where h(c,m) > 0 is h.o.d. 1 in c and m (A-10)
These preferences correspond to the ﬁrst and second case (equations 10 and 11) in Andres,
David Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2002). Note that the preference satisfy, for any ﬁxed l,
the BGP requirement that Uc/Ul is homogenous of degree 1 in (c,m) and that Um/Uc is
homogenous of degree 0 in (c,m).14.
Some parametric conditions must be satisﬁed to have a liquidity eﬀect. Typically these
imply a low intertemporal substitution elasticity ( high σ in Gali (2002) ) in a model without
14The ﬁrst condition ensures consistency with a unit income elasticity, the second that the ratio m/c is a
function of the interest rate (see the discussion in Section 6 of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996))
9capital. To see this note that from the money demand condition M/(PY ) = R−η the presence
of the liquidity eﬀect means that R fall if M increases. To have this eﬀect it must be that
the denominator PY does not increase much as M increases. Now if P is ”ﬁxed” because
of sticky prices, this requires that Y does not increase much; this condition obtains if the
intertemporal substitution elasticity is low.
Imposing requirements (1) and (2) in the NK models (without capital) implies that pref-
erences must either be of the ﬁrst type (log-log), but then this gives no liquidity eﬀect given
the low substitution elasticity of the log case (σ = 1, see Gali (2002) ). One must then use the
non-separable speciﬁcation. Of course non-separability implies a diﬀerent set of equations
than the ones used in NK models, where the money balances do not aﬀect the determination
of real variables. Andres, David Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2002) discuss the case of non-
separable preferences (their utility function 11, section 4.2) and ﬁnd that no parametrization
allows them to produce a liquidity eﬀect on impact (see their ﬁgure 2) .
D Literature Review
D.1 Interest elasticity, liquidity eﬀects and the price puzzle
Here we give a brief account of estimates of parameters that quantify two key experiments
for the model: the long run interest rate elasticity of the money demand, and the size and
persistence of the liquidity eﬀect.
There are many estimates of the interest rate elasticity of money demand. In our model,
the parameter 1/(1 + ρ) correspond to the long run elasticity of the money demand, so we
refer to the studies that better much this concept. Lucas (2000) and Stock and Watson (1993)
identify this elasticity using the long-run behavior of interest rates and velocity using almost
a century of annual data. Lucas preferred estimate is 0.5 for the elasticity of M1 velocity with
respect to interest rates, or equivalently a semi-elasticity of velocity with respect to interest
rates of 0.8, while Stock and Watson’s estimate of the M1 semi-elasticity is 1.0. Hoﬀman,
Rasche, and Tieslau (1995) ﬁnd long run elasticities similar to the ones estimated by Lucas for
ﬁve industrialized countries.15 There is a widespread view that the short run money demand
elasticity is substantially smaller than the long run elasticity, see, for instance, Goodfriend
1991). Lucas (2000) and Stock and Watson (1993) interpret the lack of stability as evidence
that it takes a very long-span on data to have enough low frequency variation to uncover the
elasticities.
Papers that incorporate more recent data, such as Ball (2001) and Ireland (2009), ﬁnd
evidence of instability on the long-run money demand using M1, and also evidence of smaller
elasticities. Ireland (2009) ﬁnds evidence of a downward shift on money demand after 1980.
Ireland estimates elasticities of M1 velocity with respect to interest rates of about 0.05 and
semi-elasticities about 1.5 using data after 1980. Ireland, as well as others, interpret the shift
on money demand as due to ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation. One approach suggested
15The diﬀerence between the interest rate elasticities around 0.5 found by Lucas (2000) and Hoﬀman,
Rasche, and Tieslau (1995), and the one in Stock and Watson (1993) around 0.1 is due to the treatment of
the income elasticity of money demand. In Lucas (2000) and Hoﬀman, Rasche, and Tieslau (1995) a unitary
elasticity is imposed, while in Stock and Watson (1993) income elasticities are estimated.
10by this ﬁnding is to use a diﬀerent monetary aggregate constructed to better reﬂect the
changes in regulatory environment, such as MZM, or “money of zero maturity”, or M1S
(M1 plus balances “swept”, see Dutkowsky, Cynamon, and Jones (2006) for details). Studies
using MZM, such as Teles and Zhou (2005) and Carlson et al. (2000), ﬁnd a more stable
money demand. Teles and Zhou (2005) report elasticities of the MZM velocity with respect
to interest rates of about 0.25, and Carlson and Keen (1996) ﬁnd a interest rate semi-elasticity
of around 4.0 (See table 10).
Summarizing, estimates of long run interest rate elasticities for money demand range be-
tween 0.25 and 0.5, depending on the time periods and monetary aggregates. These estimates
are based on low frequency, decade to decade, changes on velocity and interest rates.
While the liquidity eﬀect is present in most description of how monetary shocks aﬀect
interest rates, innovations on interest rates and monetary growth do not display the negative
correlation suggested by the liquidity eﬀect –see, for instance, Leeper and Gordon (1992).
The most common interpretation of this feature of the data is that there are lots of changes
in the money supply that are accommodating high frequency changes on money demand.
Following this interpretation the literature has used a variety of identifying assumptions
to isolate the changes in money supply that accommodate high frequency money demand
shocks.
There is a large literature on the eﬀect of “monetary policy shocks” using VARs. The
estimates in this literature diﬀer according to the assumptions used to identify the monetary
policy shock, the time period and the variables included in the VARs. Yet, almost all of the
estimates are based on the assumption that there is a liquidity eﬀect. While the focus of this
literature is on the eﬀect of monetary shocks on output, the estimated impulse responses can
be used to quantify the size of the impact eﬀect, as well as the persistence of interest rates
and monetary aggregates after a monetary shock.
Estimates using VARs typically display persistent eﬀects on interest rates of an innovation
on monetary policy, or a monetary policy shock. See for instance the survey of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) where the impulse response of interest rates seem to be well
described as an AR process, with a half life of about half a year. The VARs also estimate
the path of monetary aggregates that will follow a monetary shock. For the purpose of
the theory developed in this paper, the persistence of the liquidity eﬀect, as well as its
magnitude depends on the persistence of the path of the relevant monetary aggregate that
follows a monetary shock. Depending on the assumption on identiﬁcation of a “monetary
shock”, and the choices of monetary aggregate, diﬀerent behavior of monetary aggregates is
found.
For instance, one of the identiﬁcation schemes used in the literature focuses on the behav-
ior of Non-borrowed reserves (or the ratio of borrowed to non-borrowed reserves), as opposed
to a broader monetary aggregate such as M1 or M2. This assumption is meant to reﬂect
the operating procedure of the Fed, which accommodates high frequency shocks to reserves.
While this assumption may be a good description of the Fed operating procedures, it is not
part of the theoretical model, which complicates the mapping between the estimated impulse
response and the theoretical path described in the models. In the survey by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) they compare diﬀerent identiﬁcation schemes, and in partic-
ular the behavior of Non-Borrowed reserves and broader monetary aggregates. Indeed the
patterns of adjustment seem to diﬀer across monetary aggregates. Non-borrowed reserves,
11M0, and M1 seem to display “u” shaped patterns after a contractionary shock, while M2
seem to display a persistent decrease.
Another statistic of interest that appears in the literature is the diﬀerence between the
long and short run elasticities of the money demand. For instance Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999) compute the short run money demand elasticity, by the ratio of the impact
eﬀects on interest rates and money on the impulse response of the estimated VAR. They ﬁnd
that the semi-elasticity of the money demand is smaller than what other estimate based on
long run data, say -1.0, to be compared with values between -4.0 and -8.0 discussed above.
Finally, we comment brieﬂy on the behavior of the price level in the model and in the
estimated impulse responses. A common speciﬁcation in the literature is that, by construc-
tion, the price level cannot jump contemporaneously with the monetary contraction. The
estimated subsequent behavior of the price level after a monetary contraction, depends on the
variables included in the system, and to a lesser extent, the period considered. Indeed, the
simpler system tend to ﬁnd an increase in the price level after a contractionary shock, a fea-
ture that is called “the price puzzle”, since it is against the hypothesis of nominal rigidities.16
Speciﬁcations where the price puzzle is not observed, which typically consist on including
variables such as the price of commodities, display a slow decrease in the price level after a
contractionary shock. This pattern is consistent with model with nominal rigidities.
The model in this paper has no rigidities on the price adjustment, so the price level can
jump on impact after a monetary shock. The importance of nominal rigidities is not a central
topic of this paper, indeed one can consider the same model with sticky prices. In the current
version with ﬂexible prices, the reaction of inﬂation diminishes the strength of the liquidity
eﬀect. Recall that in the case of i.i.d. shocks to the growth rate of money  t, interest rates
decrease after an open market operation because the price level increase proportionally with
the amount of money, but traders receive a more than proportional amount. Instead, in a
sticky price version of the model, the increase on traders’ real balances will be even higher.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) use M2 as a monetary aggregate, and in a
quarterly model ﬁnd that after a monetary expansion, interest rates decrease in a persis-
tent fashion. The point estimates indicate that the response of interest rates is a bit more
persistent than the response of M2, which can be well approximated by an AR(2) with auto-
correlation 0.5 and hence a half-life of 3 months. Their estimates display the “price puzzle”,
i.e. inﬂation has a small protracted initial decrease. The estimates in Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) also show similar patterns, where the point estimates of the interest
rate impulse response is more persistent than the one for money growth. Altig et al. (2005)
estimate the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock, using MZM as a measure of money. The re-
sult are roughly similar to those in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001, 2005) but they
also feature velocity. They estimate that the impulse response of velocity and interest rates
comoves, as if were generated by a money demand with a small interest rate semi-elasticity.
In summary, the literature present plenty of estimates of the liquidity eﬀect after a mon-
etary shock, but the emphasis and interest of the papers is not on measuring monetary
aggregates or the relative persistence. As a consequence, future version of this paper will
include estimated VARs that are tailored to estimate the relative persistence of interest rates
16Notice that an alternative explanation of this puzzle is that the shock identify the economy behaves
according to the Fisherian fundamentals, i.e. higher interest rates are associated with higher inﬂation.
12and velocity of monetary aggregates. In particular the monetary aggregates will be chosen
to be consistent with the ones that produce stable long run money demands.
D.2 Monetary Segmented Asset Models
In Lucas (1990) asset and good markets are separated within the period, but at the end of the
period all agents pool their resources. Similar assumptions are made in the base-line models
of Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), who use set-ups closely related to
the one in Lucas (1990) to study the eﬀects on output of a monetary shock. In Alvarez and
Atkeson (1997) agents visit the asset market at exogenously randomly distributed times, at
which they eﬀectively −via the complete market assumption− pool resources. In Alvarez,
Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) agents face a ﬁxed cost of accessing the asset market, making
participation endogenous and time-varying. Yet the parameters considered and the nature of
the equilibrium is such that, at the end of the period the distribution of asset is degenerate.
Finally, the closest environments to the one consider in this paper are the ones in Alvarez,
Lucas, and Weber (2001) and in Occhino (2004). In these set ups a fraction λ of the agents
have permanent access to asset markets, the remaining fraction is excluded from the asset
markets permanently. Apart from these diﬀerences in the way that agents are segmented
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November 2, 2011E The Non-Trader problem in continuous time
Since in our discrete time analysis, the speed of convergence and the elasticity of m/c depend
on the value of a stock/ﬂow, namely the steady state value of m/c, we analyze the continuous
time version of the non-trader problem. The continuous time version has two advantages.
One is that it deals more naturally with the stock/ﬂow distinction. The other one is that it
simpliﬁes some expression, which are key for the impact of money on interest rate shocks.







˙ m(t) + c(t) = y + τ − πm(t)
and m(0) > 0 given. Here π is the continuously compounded inﬂation rate and δ is the
discount rate. The steady state of this problem is the same as the discrete time version,
given by
Um (¯ c, ¯ m)
Uc (¯ c, ¯ m)
= δ + π ≡ r.
In the case where U is given by (12), recall that ¯ c and ¯ m are independent of γ and depend only
on the properties of h, in particular we obtain ¯ m/¯ c = (1/A)r−1/(1+ρ). We let c = ψ(m) the
optimal decision rule for consumption. From the budget constraint the dynamics of m(t) for
values close to the steady state ¯ m, is governed by ∂ ˙ m(t)/∂m = −π − ψ′ (¯ m). In the next
proposition we keep ﬁxed the value of δ, π, and regard γ, ρ and the steady state value of
¯ m/¯ c as parameters. The interpretation is that the value of the parameter A is changed as a
function of ρ and ¯ m/¯ c.
Proposition 9. Assume that π ≥ 0, and that U is given by (12). Keeping the steady
state value ¯ m/¯ c ﬁxed, the slope of the optimal consumption function evaluated at steady
















¯ c ψ′(¯ m) is decreasing in
γ
1+ρ.
As anticipated in the continuous time limit the particular threshold value of m/c = 1
plays no role.
Proof of Proposition 9. Using λ for the co-state, the Hamiltonian H is
H (c,m) = U (c,m) + λ[−mπ + y + τ − c]
The f.o.c. are:
˙ λ = −ρλ − Hm : ˙ λ = λ(δ + π) − Um (c,m), and Hc = 0 : Uc (c,m) = λ.
1The steady state is then:
Um
Uc
(¯ c, ¯ m) = δ + π , π ¯ m + ¯ c = y + τ.
From Uc (c(t),m(t)) = λ(t) we obtain:
˙ cUcc + ˙ mUcm = ˙ λ,
replacing into the ˙ λ expression:
˙ cUcc (c,m) + ˙ mUcm (c,m) = Uc (c,m)(π + δ) − Um
and using the budget constraint for ˙ m:
˙ cUcc (c,m) = Uc (c,m)(π + δ) − [y + τ − mπ − c]Ucm (c,m) − Um (c,m)
Linearizing this ODE around (˙ c, ˙ m,c,m) = (0,0,¯ c, ¯ m) we obtain
˙ c = (π + δ)
Ucc
Ucc
(c − ¯ c) + (π + δ)
Ucm
Ucc
(m − ¯ m) +
Ucm
Ucc




(m − ¯ m) −
Umm
Ucc
(m − ¯ m) −
Umc
Ucc
(c − ¯ c)
where all the second derivatives are evaluated at the steady state values. Summarizing we
have the linear system:
˙ c = a(c,m) ≡ [π + δ](c − ¯ c) +
 
Ucm (2π + δ) − Umm
Ucc
 
(m − ¯ m)
˙ m = b(c,m) ≡ y + τ − mπ − c
We are looking for a solution of the form
c = ψ (m) = ¯ c + ψ
′ (¯ m)(m − ¯ m).








a(ψ (¯ m), ¯ m)










−π − ψ′ (¯ m)
,
where the last equality uses L’Hopital rule. The quadratic equation for ψ′ is then
−ψ
′ (π + ψ
′) + (π + δ)ψ
′ +
 




2The stable solution is given by
ψ
′ =








Now we specialize the utility function U to (12). First we show that if γ = 0, then

































h12 (r + π) − h22
−h11
= [r + π]




















−[r + π] +
  





























































h22/h11 + γr2 (h1h1)/(−hh11)




































































1 + γ (h1h1)/(−hh11)
so
∆(γ) ≡


















































Thus ∆(γ/(1 + ρ)) is decreasing in γ provided that π > 0. Since
ψ
′(¯ m,γ) =





then ψ′ (γ) is decreasing in γ. Q.E.D.
F Linearizing the model for a generic  t process
Uhlig (1998) develops a convenient matlab code to solve linear models. A linear model is
deﬁned by the following equations,
0 = A xt + B xt−1 + C yt + D zt (A-11)
0 = Et [F xt+1 + G xt + H xt−1 + J yt+1 + K yt + L zt+1 + M zt] (A-12)
zt+1 = N zt + εt+1 with Et(εt+1) = 0 (A-13)
where A, B, C, D, F, G, H, J, K, L. M, N are matrices and xt,yt and zt are vectors.
One should think of xt as endogenous state-type variables, yt as control-type variables and
zt as exogenous state-type variables. The timing of the model is that the beginning of
a period xt−1, and zt are given by history and xt and yt should be determined so that the
equations above hold. Harald’s code is a sophisticated version of the method of undetermined
4coeﬃcients, i.e. it gives a linear solution as
xt = P xt−1 + Q zt
yt = R xt−1 + S zt
i.e. the code gives the matrices P,Q,R and S.
In our case the vector x, y and z are
xt =
 










t , ˆ m
T
t , ˆ m
N
t , ˆ πt, ˆ rt
 
where  1,t and  2,t are two AR(1) process that compose money growth according to  t =
 1,t+ 2,t. The equations in (A-11) are the market clearing for consumption, market clearing
for money, deﬁnition of ˆ nN
t in terms of ˆ mN
t , the deﬁnition of ˆ πt in terms of ˆ  t, ˆ mt and ˆ mt−1,

















































































λ 1 − λ 0 0 0 0
0 0 λ 1 − λ 0 0
0 0 0 −1 −¯ n/¯ π2 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0
(1 + ρ)/¯ c 0 −(1 + ρ)/¯ m 0 0 −1/¯ r














































































0 ¯ U11 +
β
¯ π2





















0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −
  β
¯ π2



































0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0













































and the equation in (A-13) is the law of motion for the growth rate of the money supply.
 
ˆ  1,t+1
ˆ  2,t+1
 
=
 
θ1 0
0 θ2
  
ˆ  1,t
ˆ  2,t
 
+
 
ε1,t+1
ε2,t+1
 
.
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